Harmful practices affecting the rights of children
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) meeting at its 69th Ordinary Session held virtually from 15 November to 5 December 2021;
Recalling its mandate to promote and protect human and peoples' rights in Africa under Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter);
Further Recalling its previous press statements published since its promotional Mission to Cameroon from 1 to 7 February 2011, asking all parties to hold a constructive and inclusive dialogue to end human rights violations in the country, as well as independent and impartial investigations on the alleged human rights violations including extra judicial killings; enforced disappearances; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and also requesting a general mission of promotion of human rights ;
Further Recalling the relevant provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter) concerning the protection of the right to life, respect for human dignity, prevention of torture, prevention of extrajudicial and arbitrary executions, and protection of children’s rights;
Conscious of the relevant provisions of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child on ensuring the survival, protection and development of the child, protection and care of children affected by armed conflict, protection and special assistance for children deprived of their family environment;
Recalling Resolution ACHPR/Res. 395 (LXII) 2018 on the Human Rights Situation in Cameroon; and ResolutionACHPR/Res. 405 (LXIII) 2018 on the Continuing Human Rights Violations in the Republic of Cameroon adopted at its62nd Ordinary Session and 63rd Ordinary Session respectively;
Deeply concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in the country, in particular, about allegations of unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; beatings, harassment, especially reports received about killing of children in schools in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon, as well as killing of women;
Bearing in mind the Commission's role under Article 45, paragraph 1 (b) of the African Charter, which requires that "principles and rules are formulated and established to resolve legal problems affecting the enjoyment of human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms on which African governments can base their legislation;"
Also bearing in mind Cameroon’s obligations under the African Charter; the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and all other human rights instruments the State has ratified;
The Commission:
1. Reiterates its Condemnation to all forms of violations of rights to which civilians, in particular women and children have been directly or indirectly subjected in the context of the current crises in the Anglophone regions Cameroon;
2. Encourages the Government to work towards a more peaceful solution to the ongoing crises in order to protect the lives of the civilian population and restore unity and peace to the country;
3. Calls on the Government to undertake institutional reforms to remedy what has been dubbed as the Anglophone problem, as well as engage in Dialogue with various actors with the objective of a lasting resolution to the problem;
4. Calls on the Government to ensure respect for its international obligations under the African Charter; the Maputo Protocol; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other human rights instruments the State is party to;
5. While recognizing steps taken by the Government to identify, investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses, including the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into some of the killings; a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; recruitment of more Anglophone magistrates and bilingual teachers; calls on the Government to authorize a Fact-finding Mission into the country, to enable the Commission ascertain the violations alleged.
Done virtually, on 5 December 2021.
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(ACERWC)
Admissibility Ruling
Communication No: 0012/Com/001/2019
Decision on Admissibility No: 001/2020
Legal and Human Rights Center and Center for Reproductive Rights (on behalf of
Tanzanian girls)
v
United Republic of Tanzania
Original- English
I. Submission of Communication
1. The Secretariat of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the Committee/ACERWC) received a Communication dated 17 June 2019 pursuant to article 44 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the Charter/ACRWC). The Communication is submitted by Legal and Human Rights Center and Center for Reproductive Rights (on behalf of Tanzanian girls) (the Complainants) against the United Republic of Tanzania (the Respondent State). Receiving the Communication, pursuant to Section III of the Committee’s Revised Guidelines for Consideration of Communication (the Revised Communications Guidelines), the Secretariat of the Committee conducted a preliminary review and registered the submission as Communication No: 0012/Com/001/2019. To facilitate the determination on the admissibility, the Communication was duly transmitted to the Respondent State through a Note Verbal, Ref DSA/ACE/64.2604.19 dated 25 June 2019, pursuant to Section IX (2) of the Revised Communications Guidelines. The Committee received a Note Verbal from the Respondent State, Ref. CHAD/239/738/01/10, dated 01 October 2019, which contains the Respondent State’s submission on the admissibility of the Communication. The response submitted by the Respondent State was not accepted by the Committee as it was signed by one of the Members of the Committee, thus raising conflict of interest contrary to what is prescribed under Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedures of the ACERWC. Hence, the Committee, through a Note Verbal, Ref. DSA/ACE/64/5333.19, dated 09 December 2019, requested the Respondent State to revise and re-submit its response. Accordingly, the Respondent State submitted its revised response on the admissibility of the Communication with a Note Verbal, Ref. No. CHAD 239/780/01/35, dated 27 August 2020 which was also sent to the Complainants on 31 August 2020. Following the Respondent State’s submission, on 01 September 2020, the Complainants, pursuant to Section IX (2) (Vi) of the Revised Communications Guidelines, further submitted their observations on the response of the Respondent State.
II. Summary of alleged facts
2. The Complainants allege that primary and secondary school girls are subjected to forced pregnancy testing and expulsion from schools in events where they are found pregnant or married. While acknowledging that the exact number of children expelled from schools for reasons of pregnancy or marriage is unknown, the Complainants submit that Tanzania’s 2013 Basic Education Statistics provides that 2433 primary schoolgirls and 4705 secondary schoolgirls dropped out of school due to pregnancy in 2012. Moreover, the Complainants allude to reports from Human Rights Watch that over 15,000 girls drop out of school every year due to pregnancy. It is also submitted that the study conducted by one of the Complainants, Center for Reproductive Rights, provides that over 55,000 female students dropped out of school due to pregnancy between 2003 and 2011.
3. The Complainants allege that mandatory pregnancy testing is practiced in almost all public schools subjecting girls as young as 11 years of age to pregnancy testing. It is submitted that the testing does not follow any standard and sometimes painful methods such as poking are applied to check for pregnancy by school personnel. The Complainants allege that pregnancy testing is undertaken without the consent of the girls and most often the results are not communicated to the girls but rather shared with school staff without the consent of the girls. Girls are also required to take pregnancy test when they enroll in schools.
4. The allegation of the Complainants provides that girls who are found to be pregnant before being enrolled will not be accepted to schools and those girls who are found to be pregnant in the school year are expelled from schools. The Applicants allude to the fact that neither pregnancy testing nor expulsion of students due to pregnancy is prescribed by the Education Regulations. The Applicants provide that pregnancy is not included as a ground of expulsion in the Education (Expulsion and Exclusion of Pupils from School) Regulation 2002 G.N. No. 295 of 2002, however, school administrators interpret pregnancy to be an offence against morality which is one of the grounds of expulsion under the Regulation. The Complainants also indicate that some school administrators expel pregnant girls from school claiming that it is government policy. As expulsion is a universal practice in public schools, girls who find out about their pregnancy by themselves dropout of school to escape the humiliation and stigma they will be subjected to if school administers find out about their pregnancy during mandatory testing. Moreover, the Complainants submit that the expulsion and exclusion of pregnant school girls has no exception such as in cases where girls fall pregnant due to sexual abuse or incest even in cases where police report can be produced to that effect.
5. The Communication further alleges that married girls are not allowed to register or remain in school once married and this is vividly provided by the Respondent State’s Regulation on Expulsion and Exclusion of Pupils. The Complainants submit that the Education (Imposition of Penalties to Persons who marry or Impregnate a School Girl) Rules 2003, G.N. No. 265 of 2003 penalizes anyone who marries or impregnates a schoolgirl. The Communication highlights that this is in contradiction with the laws of the Respondent State as the Marriage Act allows girls as young as 14 to get married. The Communication also indicates that there is a court decision which rules that the age of marriage for girls set below 18 has been declared unconstitutional but has not entered into force due to an ongoing appeal on the decision of the High Court.
6. Moreover, the Complainants allege that the expulsion and exclusion policy of the Government is a permanent one as school girls are not readmitted to the public school after delivery. School girls who have been expelled due to pregnancy or marriage can only be readmitted to private schools or vocational training schools. The Complainants further allege that these options are not always accessible or limit the education path girls wish to pursue. While noting that since 2014 the Education and Training Policy has incorporated a provision which provides that students who left school for any reason should be readmitted, the Complainants submit that this has never been implemented. The Communication also submits that recent statements by high level officials of the Respondent State including the President have alluded to the fact that the Government of the Respondent State will intensify its effort to expel students who fall pregnant and also to ensure their non-readmission to schools. The Complainants also submit affidavits of girls who have been denied to re-enter school after giving birth due to the statements of the officials, mainly the President.
7. The Communication includes facts that school personnel usually report pregnancies as the Child Act and the Ministry of Education Rules prescribe penalty against those who impregnate girls. The Complainants submit that such reports are subjecting girls to unlawful detention or harassment as they are often detained or harassed until they expose the identity of the person who impregnated them. Furthermore, the Communication alleges that girls who fall pregnant due to sexual abuse are exposed to the same risk of detention and harassment subjecting them to secondary victimization. The Complainants refer to the assessment undertaken by the Tanzanian Commission on Human Rights and Good Governance to allege that children are detained in harsh conditions, denied of visits by caregivers, and subjected to delayed case hearings. The Communication therefore alleges that girls are being detained when they refuse or are unable to testify against who impregnated them although being pregnant by itself is not provided as a crime. The Communication cites the statement of the Regional Commissioner who ordered regional and district commissioners of education to arrest pregnant girls who refused to identify the person who impregnated them. Following the order, the Communication alleges that 55 pregnant school girls were arrested in Tandahimba District. Such practices and policies discourage pregnant girls or parents from seeking information or assistance including reporting cases of sexual abuse especially in cases where the perpetrators are unknown. Even when the perpetrators are known, the Complainants allege that proper investigation is not carried out to prosecute them.
8. The Communication finally alleges that girls in the Respondent State are deprived of access to sexual reproductive health information and services to prevent unplanned pregnancies. Girls who are pregnant are not also provided with pregnancy related services such as information on family planning, and transmittable diseases. The Complainants allege that lack of information and services on sexual reproductive health issues has resulted in a high rate of teenage pregnancy and unsafe abortion as well as disproportionate risk of teenage pregnant girls’ death in the Respondent State. The number of teenage girls who fall pregnant is higher among those with lower education, lower income and girls in rural areas. The Complainants claim that there is lack of comprehensive sexual education in schools as sexuality education mainly focuses on abstinence and is provided in secondary education level where girls are already sexually active. In addition, girls are not provided with any kind of sexual reproductive health services or information during mandatory pregnancy testing such as contraception options or prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. The sexual reproductive health services available in the Respondent State are not youth friendly and hence girls are not encouraged to access such services even when they are available. The Communication submits that lack of information and services on sexual reproductive health result in unwanted and unplanned pregnancy of girls who are then forced to leave their education as a result of pregnancy. It is also increasing the number of unsafe abortions among adolescent girls which is also exacerbated by restrictive abortion law of the Respondent State.
III. Applicants’ submission on admissibility
9. The Complainants argue that the Communication fulfills the requirement of admissibility under Section XI (1) of the Revised Communications Guidelines.
10. The Complainants particularly focus on the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies, where they submit that the communication fulfills the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. The Communication provides that one of the
Complainants, Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), along with the National Organization for Legal Assistance filed a case at the High Court of the Respondent State on behalf of school girls against the Minister of Education and Vocational Training and the Attorney General alleging that forced pregnancy testing and the practice of expelling pregnant girls from school violates the Constitution of the Respondent State. The case was filed on 13 September 2012 and after receiving the reply of the Respondents in that case, the High Court rescheduled the case three times the final of which was scheduled for 02 May 2013. The Complainants submit that hearing could not be held on the scheduled day as the assigned judge decided to recuse himself from the case. The High Court announced that the case has been reassigned to another judge on 26 November 2013 and rescheduled the preliminary hearing twice after which it decided to get the preliminary objection in writing. The Communication alleges that after numerous appointments, the Court dismissed the preliminary objection on 13 November 2015, more than three years after the filing of the case. The Communication also provides that the hearing of the merits was withheld by the Court for various reasons until 04 May 2017 when the Court decided to receive arguments on the merit in writing. The Court rendered decision on 04 August 2017 dismissing the case of the petitioners entirely on the basis of lack of evidence of discrimination and further decided that pregnancy is a matter of discipline that should be left for schools. Following the decision, the Complainants indicate that a notice of appeal was submitted to the Court of Appeal on 14 August 2017, however, the certified judgment and proceedings of the High Court were provided only on 11 April 2018. The Complainants allege that despite all procedures fulfilled, the Court of Appeal has not given a hearing date on their appeal until the day they submitted the current Communication to the Committee.
11. Based on these facts, the Complainants argue that local remedies have been unduly prolonged, hence they should not be required to wait any further for remedy at local level. The Complainants refer to Section IX (1)(d) of the Guidelines for Consideration of Communications which provides that local remedy may not be exhausted if it is unduly prolonged or ineffective. The Communication also makes reference to the Minority Rights Group International v. Mauritania case and IHRDA et.al on behalf of Children of Nubian descent v. Kenya case (Children of Nubian Descent case) Where the Committee ruled that seven and four years of delay respectively fulfill the requirement of unduly prolonged local remedies. Moreover, the Communication alleges that the best interest of the child should be the primary consideration in determining whether a local remedy is unduly prolonged given the irreparable harm the children will suffer. The Communication also reiterates the decision of the Committee in the Children of Nubian Descents Case where the Committee stated that one year delay constitutes 6 percent of childhood and hence it found that over 6 years delay in local court proceeding is not in the best interest of the children.
12. The Complainants further argue that the local remedies are not effective as local authorities are informed about the situation but have failed to act on it. The Complainants cite the Committee from its decision on the Michelo Hunsungule and others (on behalf of children in Northern Uganda) v. The Government of Uganda case (Children of Northern Uganda case) whereby the Committee stated that the purpose of having the requirement of exhaustion local remedies is to prevent international tribunals from serving as appellate courts and also to give States the opportunity to be able to address violations that occur in their territory. The Complainants also support their arguments with the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) citing various cases including Article 19 v Eritrea and FIDH and OMCT v Sudan where the African Commission held that local remedies are ineffective and need not be exhausted in cases where the State has been provided with ample notice of the alleged violations and yet the State fails to take measures. The Communication further makes reference to Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan where the African Commission held that in cases of clear human rights violations, domestic and international attention alone may suffice to confirm that the State has received notice. In the current case, the Complainants argue that the practice of expelling pregnant girls from school is a widespread practice which the Respondent State is aware of and tries to defend and further that international reports as well as appeals including by the Committee, the Commission and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child have been provided for the Respondent State. Therefore, the Complainants submit that local remedies are ineffective as the Respondent State has failed to act on the violations that have been brought to its attention.
13. Finally, the Complainants argue that local remedies are not available as the violations are massive and serious. The Communication makes reference to the decision of the Committee in the Children of Northern Uganda case in which the Committee granted exemption from exhausting local remedies on the basis that the violation affected thousands of children and the violation occurred on a large scale. The Complainants further support their argument by the jurisprudence of the African Commission where the Commission decided that local remedies need not be exhausted in massive and serious human rights violation cases. The Complainants rely on the definition of massive and serious human rights violation by the Commission in the Open Society Justice Initiative v. Cote d’Ivoire case where the Commission held that ‘a massive violation is one that affects a large number of persons, either in a specific region or all over the territory of a State Party. Concerning the nature, the violation must be the consequence of continual and pre-determined actions having an impact on a right or a group of rights under the African Charter’. The Communication argues that there are a large number of girls who are being affected by the expulsion which makes it massive and it would be impractical to require all these girls to exhaust local remedies.
IV. Respondent’s submission on admissibility
14. In its response to the arguments of the Complainants on the admissibility of the Communication, the Respondent State submits that the Communication is not admissible as it does not fulfill the conditions listed down under the Revised Communication Guidelines.
15. The Respondent State submits that the Communication raises matters pending before another international human rights body, hence does not fulfill the requirement of admissibility under Section IX (1(c) of the Revised Communication Guidelines. The Respondent State submits that a similar joint communication has been submitted to the Special Mechanisms of the Human Rights namely the Working Group on Discrimination of Women in Law and Practice under Reference No. AL TZA 3/2017 dated 14 August 2014 and Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education under Reference No JAL TZA 1/2018 dated 22 February 2018. The Respondent State supports its submission using various decisions of other treaty bodies among others the decision of the African Commission in the Amnesty International v Tunisia, Mpaka- Nsusu V Zaire, and Interights v Eritrea and Ethiopia cases where it declared the Communications inadmissible as they were pending before the UN Human Rights Commission. The Respondent State argues that the Special Mechanisms are part of the Human Rights Council mechanism and hence fits in the UN Charter Procedure in accordance with Section IX 1(c) of the Guidelines of the ACERWC.
16. Furthermore, the Respondent State argues that the Communication is inadmissible as the Complainants have not exhausted local remedies available in the Respondent State. In its submission, the Respondent State argues that the Complainants should not be granted an exemption from exhausting local remedies as local remedies are available, effective, and sufficient in the domestic system. The Respondent State argues that the fact that one of the Complainants filed a case against the Ministry of Education before the High Court and later filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal reveals that there is a judicial remedy available at domestic level. The Respondent State, making reference to the Decision of the African Commission in the Amnesty International and Other V Sudan, submits that the existence of the right to appeal satisfies the condition of effectiveness of local remedies. The Respondent State further submits that its judiciary is independent and the effectiveness of a local remedy is assessed on the basis of prospect of success, not the awareness of authorities about the violation, hence the judicial and administrative role of the State should not be confused. The Respondent State also relies on the decision of the Committee on Ahmed Bassiouny v Arab Republic of Egypt and Sohaib Emad v Arab Republic of Egypt in submitting that evidence should be produced to show ineffectiveness of local remedies and a mere doubt does not make a remedy ineffective. In providing evidence that a local remedy is effective, the Respondent State cites Rebeca Z. Gyumi v The Attorney General where both the High Court and the Court of Appeal Tanzania declared Section 13 and 17 of the Law of Marriage Act unconstitutional for providing lower age of marriage for girls. The Respondent State submits that the Complainants should follow their appeal up to the end and their decision to abandon the local remedy they started to exhaust is against the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity of international tribunals. In supporting these arguments, the Respondent State among others refers to the decision of the Committee in the Sohaib Emad v Arab Republic of Egypt case that international and regional bodies do not serve as a first instance courts, rather as a last resort after exhausting local remedies.
17. In addition, the Respondent State submits that the Communication does not fulfill the requirement under Section IX 1(e) of the Guidelines on Consideration of Communications as it is premature and not submitted within reasonable time. The Respondent State alludes to the fact that the Court of Appeal is yet to rule on the case and the delay is normal like in other cases. Only cases that require urgency are given priority and the Respondent submits that this case is not urgent, hence the Complainants should wait for the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Highlighting the fact that conditions of admissibility are cumulative, the Respondent State seeks that the Communication is dismissed for lack of fulfilling admissibility requirements.
V. The Committee’s analysis on admissibility of the Communication
18. The Committee’s analysis of the admissibility of a Communication is guided by article 44 of the Charter and the Revised Communication Guidelines. According to article 44 of the Charter and Section I (1) of the Revised Communication Guidelines, nongovernmental organizations legally recognized by one or more of the Member States of the African Union or State Party to the Charter or the United Nations, among others can submit a Communication before the Committee. The Committee notes that LHRC is a non-governmental organization registered in Tanzania and holds an observer status before the Committee since March 2019; similarly, the Center for Reproductive Rights is an international non-governmental organization which has a regional office in Nairobi and also has an observer status before the Committee since November 2018. Considering that the Complainants fulfill the requirement to access the Committee as they are registered in Member States of the African Union, and noting that their application is filed on behalf of pregnant and married school girls, the Committee accepts the standing of the Complainants to submit the case.
19. The Committee in analyzing the admissibility of the Communication assesses whether or not the conditions of admissibility provided under Section IX (1) of the Communications Guidelines are fulfilled. After considering the argument of the Complainants and the Respondent State, the Committee has identified three contentious issues that need to be analyzed in line with the requirement listed in the Revised Communication Guidelines; these are:
i. Whether or not the Communication raises matters pending settlement by another international body;
ii. Whether the Complainants have exhausted local remedies, and whether they should be exempted from exhausting local remedies;
iii. Whether the Communication is presented within a reasonable time after exhaustion of local remedies.
i. Whether or not the Communication raises matters pending settlement by
another international body;
20. Section IX (1) (c) of Revised Communication Guidelines states that a Communication is admissible if it ‘does not raise matters pending settlement or previously settled by another international body or procedure in accordance with any legal instruments of the Africa Union and principles of the United Nations Charter’. The Respondent State submits that the same issue is raised before the Special Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council, hence it falls within the exclusionary requirement of ‘matter pending before another international procedure’. On the basis of the requirement in Section IX (1) (c) the Revised Communications Guidelines and the submission of the
Respondent State, the Committee notes that the key issue of investigation is the nature of the adjudicating body where the current Communication is pending to be settled, which is the procedure within the Special Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council.
21. While examining the matter, the Committee notes that understanding the background importance of having the above-mentioned requirement as a condition for considering admissibility of a case is crucial. The Committee recognizes that States should not be subjected to similar international and regional judicial or quasi-judicial procedures on similar alleged violations. The Committee further recognizes that having various international judicial or quasi-judicial organs should not be used in a way that creates hierarchy among such organs where one can appeal against the other. As stated in the admissibility ruling of the case Project Expedite Justice and others v The Sudan, the Committee notes that such requirement under its Guidelines are provided to prevent conflicting decisions and ensure efficiency of transnational tribunals.[1] Such criterion of admissibility has a role to play in ensuring ‘certainty and finality of international adjudications’.[2] The same has been upheld by the African Commission, from whose jurisprudence the Committee draws inspiration in line with article 46 of the Charter, where the Commission held that the rationale behind having such requirement of admissibility is ‘to desist from faulting Member States twice for the same alleged violations of human rights and ensures that no State may be sued or condemned for the same alleged violation of human rights’.[3] The Committee further reiterates the Commission’s elucidation that the requirement is a principle that guarantees the res judicata status of decisions issued by international and regional bodies mandated to adjudicate human rights cases.
22. In line with the above, regarding the current Communication, the Committee notes that the requirement of ‘pending settlement or has been settled by another body’ shall be understood in the sense that the case in question should be pending or already settled by a body that has a mandate to reach at a decision that binds that State concerned. The spirit and wording of Section IX (1)(C) of the Revised Communication Guidelines is clear that it is not referring to all kinds of mechanisms available at international or regional levels, rather it is referring to procedures that are capable of redressing a violation as it uses the term ‘settlement’. In its admissibility ruling on the case of Project Expedite Justice and others v The Sudan, where the Respondent State argued that the same matter is pending before another procedure as the issue was being considered by the United Nations Security Council, the Committee held that ‘[f]or the Committee to consider any other procedure as considering or having settled a matter, the body or procedure must be able to address in substance the rights given to the child by the African Children’s Charter. Hence, the organ or body in question must have a mandate comparable to the Committee.’[4] Since, the UN Security Council does not have a mandate comparable to the Committee, the Committee decided that the matter cannot be regarded as pending before another international procedure and therefore dismissed the argument of the Respondent State in the stated case. Drawing inspiration from other jurisdictions, the Committee refers to the decision of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) on the Celis Laureano v Peru case, where the HRC held that international settlement for the purpose of admissibility does not include extra- conventional procedures that are tasked with assessing or reporting on certain human rights violations in specific territories.[5] More similar to the case at hand, in the Madoui V Algeria case, the HRC declared the case admissible despite the fact that the same issue has been submitted before the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances as such mechanisms are not what are meant by international settlement under its Optional Protocol.[6] Likewise the African Commission spelled out that a case is deemed to be settled if it is considered by an international treaty body or adjudication mechanism.[7] The Commission further mentions that consideration by another international procedure entails a procedure that ‘is capable of granting declaratory or compensatory relief to victims, not mere political resolutions and declarations’, hence matters considered by the UN Security Council or Human Rights Council are not precluded from being entertained by the Commission.
23. The Committee also notes that the mandate of the Special Rapporteurs or Working Groups of the Human Rights Council is limited to sending communications to the concerned State in a form of letters or reports and requesting the State to respond on the same.[8] The Special Mechanisms then report their communications and the replies of States to the Human Rights Council. As such, they do not have the mandate to issue any form of relief or decision on the complaints they receive. If the Committee considers the current communication, it cannot be said that the Respondent State is being subjected to an international procedure more than once on the same matter as no decision or relief was or can be issued to the victims by the above-mentioned special mechanisms.
24. The Respondent State relied on various cases in substantiating its argument that the case is pending before another procedure including the Mpaka-Nsusu V Zaire case and Interights v Eritrea and Ethiopia case of the African Commission among others. However, the Committee notes that the jurisprudences in which the Respondent State relied on are not similar to the case at hand. The Mpaka-Nsusu V Zaire case was declared inadmissible by the African Commission because it was already considered by the Human Rights Committee which is a treaty body with a quasi-judicial human rights mandate similar to the Commission.[9] The Commission in the Interights v Eritrea and Ethiopia case did not declare the case inadmissible; rather admitted the case and suspended the consideration until the Claims Commission make a decision.[10]
25. On the basis of the above, the Committee decides that the complaints that have been submitted to the Special Rapporteur on Education and the Working Groups on Discrimination against Women in Law and Practice do not qualify as matters ‘pending settlement or previously settled’ under Section IX (1) (c) of the Guidelines, hence the Committee is not prevented from considering the Communication.
11. Whether the Complainants have exhausted local remedies, and whether they
should be exempted from exhausting local remedies
26. The second issue in relation to admissibility in the current Communication is the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. The Committee notes, Section IX (1) (d) of the Revised Communication Guidelines provides that a Communication is admissible, among others, if submitted ‘after having exhausted available and accessible local remedies, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged or ineffective’. While the Complainants argue that local remedy has been unduly prolonged and is not available and effective, the Respondent State, referring to the previous cases, argues that local remedies are indeed available and effective. Examining the matter in contestation, the Committee refers to the long established principle that only judicial remedies that are ‘available, effective, and sufficient’ should be exhausted.[11] The availability of a local remedy is assessed in terms of the ability of the Complainants to make use of the remedy in their case.[12] The rationale behind the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is not to create impediment on access to redress at supranational level, but rather to make sure that States are given the information about the alleged violations and an opportunity to redress such violations within their available means. States should be given ample notice about the violation that is occurring before being called at international or regional level to account for those violations.[13] Moreover, Complainants are required to exhaust local remedies because local remedies are ‘cheaper, quicker, and more effective’.[14] However, treaty bodies, like this Committee, may entertain a case without a local remedy being exhausted to the end when such remedy is unduly prolonged[15] despite the fact that a remedy is available or could be effective if pursued.
27. In the current Communication, it is submitted that one of the Complainants has attempted to exhaust local remedies since 13 September 2012 when the case was initially filed at the High Court of Tanzania and the High Court gave its decision on 04 August 2017, 5 years after the submission of the case. It was further submitted that even though the Complainants filed a notice of Appeal at the domestic level on 14 August 2017, the Court of Appeal has not given them a hearing date until this case was filed before the Committee in 2019. The Committee believes that time is of a crucial essence of local remedy particularly for children as their best interests demands it and also they have a limited period to enjoy the rights accorded to them as such rights are prescribed by time. As the Committee, in the children of Nubian Descents Case pronounced, a court proceeding that is pending for over 6 years is not in line with the obligation of States to take proactive action and give immediate attention for the realization of children’s rights.[16] Likewise in the case Minority Rights Group International and other v Mauritania, the Committee found that four years of pending case at an appeal stage without any decision amounts to an unduly prolonged domestic remedy, hence the Committee concluded such instance forms a sufficient ground for exemption from exhaustion of local remedies requirement.[17] Referring to the practice with other jurisdictions, the Committee notes that a similar approach is followed by various international and regional bodies. The Human Rights Committee has declared that a proceeding that lasted 6 years at domestic level is an unduly prolonged local remedy which makes a case admissible at the Committee without having the need to wait for the final result of the court proceeding.[18] The Inter American Human Rights Court has also held that a case that has taken 5 years or more since the initial process can result in exemption of the requirement of local remedies.[19] The Committee is cognizant of the fact that there is no fixed amount of years to say that a local remedy is unduly prolonged, rather it is decided on a case by case basis giving due regard to the rights of children at stake. The Committee, while drawing inspiration from the above-mentioned cases, is in no way attempting to prescribe a definitive amount of time for what needs to be considered as ‘unduly prolonged local remedy’. It is the view of the Committee that the amount of time and the nature of the right invoked along with the best interests of the child should determine whether a local remedy is unduly prolonged or not.
28. In the current Communication, the Committee notes that the domestic remedy has taken over 7 years in total and the appeal has taken 2 years without the Court fixing a date for a hearing of the case. Given the time that has lapsed during the consideration of the case by the High Court and the rights of children at stake, the Complainants should no more be subjected to wait for the decision of the Court of Appeal whose proceeding so far has not demonstrated to be any faster. The right to education that is being alleged to have been violated is an essential right for children, which has a long-lasting effect on the wellbeing of children. Education determines the future of children and a domestic proceeding that is prolonged on such fundamental right should not be regarded as a remedy that should be sought till the end process. The Committee, therefore, holds the view that the domestic remedy is unduly prolonged.
29. The Committee does not find the argument of the Respondent State acceptable where it relies on previous cases of the Committee namely Ahmed Bassiouny v Arab Republic of Egypt and Sohaib Emad v Arab Republic of Egypt in arguing that local remedies are effective. The Committee would like to differentiate between the case at hand and the abovementioned two cases invoked by the Respondent State. Both in Ahmed Bassiouny v Arab Republic of Egypt and Sohaib Emad v Arab Republic of Egypt cases the Committee declined the communication as the Applicants were anticipating the ineffectiveness of the local remedy by relying on previous cases or merely casting doubts without trying to exhaust any remedy at local level.[20] However, in the present case, the Committee notes that the Complainants have attempted to engage the domestic courts and waited for 5 years to get a decision from the High Court, and appealed to the Court of Appeal which took long time to fix the hearing date. Such practices entail that the domestic remedy is proved to be unduly prolonged while the State has been given ample time to address the violation. Hence, it is the view of the Committee that the Complainants argument is not based on a mere anticipation, rather proven records of unduly prolonged domestic proceedings. The Committee reiterates, one of the reasons for exhaustion of local remedies is to give notice to the concerned State about the alleged violations so that it gets the opportunity to address the allegation. In this regard, the Committee, in addition to the local remedies sought by one of the Complainants, refers to the attempts by various international and regional interventions that have drawn the attention of the Respondent State on the same matter covered in the current Communication. In this regard, the Committee particularly refers to the Committee’s and African Commission’s joint letter of urgent appeal sent to the Respondent State regarding the right to education of pregnant girls on 21 July 2017 with Ref:
ACHPR/LPROT/SM/652/17 regarding the school attendance by pregnant girls and young mothers in the Respondent State. In such circumstance, the Committee takes a strong view that it is against the best interests of the girls in the Respondent State to subject them to prolonged domestic proceedings on a matter that the Government of the Respondent State is well aware of. Moreover, the Committee declines the argument of the Respondent State that resorting to international human rights mechanism without finalizing cases at domestic level is against the subsidiarity principle of transnational systems. The Committee is duly cognizant that reginal and international mechanisms are subsidiary to domestic systems and such principle is reflected under its Revised Communications Guidelines as it prescribes exhaustion of local remedies as one criterion for admissibility of any communication. However, as explained earlier this criterion is not without exception and the exceptions in no way compromise the principle of subsidiarity.
30. With regard to the submission of both parties on the availability of domestic remedy, the Committee makes reference to some of the instances where the remedies have been rendered to be unavailable including when the power or competence of the local courts have been ousted by decrees or any form of decisions; when there is fear for life if the case is brought before local courts,[21] and when the remedies available are non-judicial or are discretionary.[22] The Respondent State argues that the attempt of the Complainants to seek remedy is a proof that remedy is available and cited cases where courts ruled favorably in cases that involved systematic issues like child marriage. The Committee takes the view that exemptions to exhaustion of local remedies are assessed on a case by case basis. The African Commission as well as the Inter American Court of Human Rights have both indicated the same, that the availability and effectiveness of a local remedy is assessed on a case by case basis.[23]A remedy may be available according to the general principle or practice of the Respondent State, however, if the Complainants are not able to use it in their circumstances, it may be regarded as unsuitable for the case.[24] While the Committee is convinced that a remedy may be available in the Respondent State for cases like the current one, it, however, notes that the remedy is unjustifiably and unduly prolonged which makes it not suitable for the Complainants to pursue.
111. Whether the Communication is presented within a reasonable time after
exhaustion of local remedies.
31. The third issue on admissibility relates to time. The Respondent State submits that the Communication does not satisfy the requirement under Section IX (1) (e) of the Revised Communication Guidelines which requires complaints to be submitted within reasonable time after exhausting local remedies. The notion of this requirement is to ensure that Complainants who allege violations act in due diligence in pursing their cases. The requirement aims at preventing delays in reaching out to international bodies after exhausting local remedies the main goal being to prevent what is known as ‘abuse of right to submission’ in other jurisdictions.[25] Even though there is no provided time under the Revised Communication Guidelines on the number of years within which cases should be submitted before the Committee after the period of exhaustion of local remedies, the Committee draws inspiration from the approach of the Human Rights Committee where it says no delay is acceptable without reasonable justification.[26] Hence, given this rationale of the provision under the Guidelines, the argument of the Respondent State that the case is premature and hence not submitted within reasonable time is misguided and out of the context of the requirement under Section IX (1) (e).
32. As to the other conditions of admissibility, the Committee does not observe any irregularity and no contention has been raised by any of the parties to the Communication.
33. For the forgoing reasons, the Committee finds that the present Communication is admissible as per its requirements under article 44 of the Charter and Section IX (1) of the Revised Guidelines for Consideration of Communications.
Adopted in September 2020 during the 35th Ordinary Session of the ACERWC
Honorable Joseph Ndayisenga
Chairperson
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
[1] ACERWC, Communication No 0011/Com/001/2018, Decision on Admissibility No 01/2019, Project Expedite Justice and others v The Sudan, para 33.
[2] Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2012, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, p321.
[3] ACHPR, Communication 260/2002, Bakweri Land Claims Committee v Cameroon, (2004), para 52.
[4] ACERWC, Communication No 0011/Com/001/2018, Decision on Admissibility No 01/2019, Project Expedite Justice and others v The Sudan, para 37.
[5] Human Rights Committee (HRC), Communication 540/1993, Celis Laureano v Peru, (25 March 1996), para 7.1
[6] HRC, Communication 1495/2006, Zohra Madoui (represented by counsel, Nassera Dutour) v Algeria Decided at 94th session, 28 October 2008, CCPR/C/94/D/1495/ 2006 para 6.2.
[7] ACHPR, Communication 279/03, Sudan Human Rights v The Sudan; ACHPR, Communication No 296/05 Centre on Human Rights and Evictions v The Sudan, May 2009, para 104.
[9] ACHPR, Communication No. 15/88 Mpaka - Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire, para. 2; HRC, Communication No. 157/1983, Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu v Zaire, Twenty Seventh Session.
[10] ACHPR, Communications 233/99- 234/99: Interights (on behalf of Pan African Movement and Citizens for Peace in Eritrea) v Ethiopia and Interights (on behalf of Pan African Movement and Inter African Group) / Eritrea para 55.
[11] ACERWC, Communication 002/2009 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and other v Kenya, para 28; ACHPR, Communications 147/95 and 149/96, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, (May 2000), para 31.
[12] ACHPR, Communications 147/95 and 149/96, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, (May 2000), para 33.
[13] ACHPR, Communication 155/96, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (Oct 2001) para 38; ACHPR,Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de I’Homme, Les Te'moins de Jehovah v Zaire (Oct 1995) para 37;
[14] ACHPR, Communication 299/05, Anuak Justice Council v Ethiopia (May 2006), para 48
[15] ACERWC, Communication No 002/2009, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and other v Kenya (March 2011) para 32; Guidelines for Communications, section IX (1)(d).
[16] ACERWC, Communication No 002/2009, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and other v Kenya (March 2011) para 33-34.
[17] ACERWC, Communication no 007/Com/003/2015, Minority Rights Group International and SOS- Esclaves on behalf of Said Ould Salem and Yarg Ould Salem v Mauritania, (2017), Para 28
[18] HRC, Communication 1085/2002, Louisa Bousroual (on behalf of Salah Saker) v Algeria (15 March 2006), para 8.3.
[19] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, para 81; IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colom-bia, preliminary objections, para 38
[20] ACERWC, Communication No 008/Com/002/2016, Sohaib Emad v Arab Republic of Egypt, (2017) para 18; ACERWC, Communication No 009/Com/001/2016, Ahmed Bassiouny v Arab Republic of Egypt, (2017) para 24 and 30.
[21] ACHPR, Communications 147/95 and 149/96, Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, (May 2000), para 3435.
[22] H Onoria ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the exhaustion of local remedies under the African Charter’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 5; ACERWC, Communication No 002/2009, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and other v Kenya (March 2011) para 30.
[23] ACHPR, Communication 299/05, Anuak Justice Council v Ethiopia (May 2006), para 49; Inter American Court of Human Rights, Fairen-Garbi and Sol^s-Corrales v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, para 89.
[24] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, 1999.
[25] Article 3, Optional Protocol of the HRC
[26] HRC, Communication 767/1997, Mr Vishwadeo Gobin v Mauritius (16 July 2001), para 6.3.
THE AFRICAN COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD (ACERWC)
DECISION ON THE COMMUNICATION SUBMITTED BY MINORITY
RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL AND SOS-ESCLAVES ON BEHALF OF
SAID OULD SALEM AND YARG OULD SALEM AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA
Communication No: 007/Com/003/2015
Decision No: 003/2017
Original: English
Decision on a communication submitted before the African Committee
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
On the matter between
Minority rights group international and Sos-esclaves on behalf of Said
Quid Salem and Yarg Ould Salem
V
The Government of the Republic of Mauritania
i. Submission of communication
1. The Secretariat of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the Committee/ACERWC) received a communication dated 15 December 2015 pursuant to Article 44(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the Charter/ACRWC). The Communication is submitted by Minority Rights Group International and SOS-Esclaves (the Complainants). According to Section IX (2) (i) of the Revised Guidelines on Consideration of Communications by the ACERWC (the Revised Communication Guidelines), the Committee transmitted a copy of the Communication to the Respondent State Party through a Note Verbal written on 05 January 2016.
2. Upon receipt of the Communication, the State Party should have submitted its response within 60 days from the date of the request from the Secretariat. The Committee then sent additional Note Verbal on 15 August 2016. As the Committee did not receive a response from the Government, and given the serious nature and time sensitiveness of the allegations by the Complainants, it decided to proceed considering the admissibility of the Communication without a response from the Respondent State.
3. After declaring the Communication admissible Committee conducted a hearing on the 28th Ordinary Session held from 21 October to 1 November 2016 in Banjul, the Gambia. At the hearing, the Complainants and the Respondent State made oral submissions and examined Said Ould Salem and Yarg Ould Salem. The hearing shed light on the arguments of both sides, in addition to giving the children an opportunity to express their views on the matter.
4. Following the hearing, the Committee conducted an on-sight investigation in Mauritania in accordance with article 45 of the Charter and section XV of the Revised Communication Guidelines. The investigation took place from 27 to 30 March 2017. The aim of the investigation was to ascertain fact with regards to the allegations of the practice of slavery in Mauritania.
5. The Complainants allege that Said Ould Salem, born in 2000 and his younger brother, Yarg Ould Salem, were born in 2003 to a Haratine mother, part of Mauritania's slave class. It is therefore alleged that Said and Yarg became automatically slaves to the to the El Hassine family.
6. The Complainants further allege that Said was required to look after the family's herd of camels, spending the majority of his time out in the bush with the animals, sleeping and eating in a make-shift camp. Yarg was also forced to undertake domestic chores including cooking, cleaning, washing closes and buying goods from the market. Besides, Yarg is required to assist his brother Said in looking after the camels from time to time.
7. The Complainants allege that the two boys worked seven days a week without pay, with no time off (even on Fridays), no time to play; instead they regularly faced corporal punishments. According to the Complainants, both Said and Yarg were not called by their given names in the El Hassine family rather they were called 'slaves'. The children were allowed to eat only leftovers. Furthermore, unlike the other children in the family, the two boys did not attend school nor did they learn the Quran.
8. The Complainants further allege that Said went to the Police Commissioner with his aunt after escaping in April, 2011 and the aunt filed a complaint on 19 April 2011 against Cheik Quid Hassine and his brothers Nedhirou Quid El Hassine, Mohamed Ould El Hassine and Tijani Quid El Hassine for holding her sister's children as slaves. The complaint was reportedly duly investigated, and charges were brought under the 2007 law, which criminalizes slavery. The charges were laid against Ahmed Ould El Hassine and his sister Oumekelthoum Mint El Hassine for practicing slavery over a child and depriving a child of education; against Mohamed Ould Sidi Mohamed, an employee of the El. Hassine family, against whom charges have not been pursued, at least for the time being, because of uncertainty over his identity. Charges were also brought against the remaining El Hassine brothers for failing to denounce a crime of which one was aware and the boys' mother for assisting in the deprivation of a person's liberty. The case was then referred to the Criminal Court in Nouakchott.
9. It is the Complainants allegation that in November, 2011 Ahmed Ould El Hassine was found guilty of holding the two brothers in slavery and depriving them of schooling. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and fined 500,000 MRO (roughly USD$1500) while his sister was acquitted of the same charges. The complainants further allege that the other four El Hassine brothers were convicted and each received 2 year suspended sentence and were each fined 100,000 MRO (roughly USD$300) while the boys' mother received a two years suspended sentence and was fined 500,000 MRO (roughly USD$1500) awarding a joint compensation of 840,000 MRO (roughly USD$2500) for Said and 240,000 MRO (roughly USD$700) for Yarg.
10. Despite the unsatisfactory decision of the Court, the Complainants allege that the State Prosecutor did not appeal the judgment on time. Moreover, according to the Complainants, in less than four months’ time after conviction, the slave-owner was released on bail for the sum of 200,000 MRO (roughly USD$600) without any prior communication to the lawyer representing the victims.
11. Finally, the Complainants allege that an appeal hearing, initially scheduled for November 2, 2015 was repeatedly postponed due to, initially, the absence of the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeal and subsequently due to the inability of the authorities to locate Ahmed Ould El Hassine following his change of address. The Complainants submitted that it is unclear what, if any, steps have actively been taken by the authorities to locate the convicted slave owner who is also presumably in breach of his bail conditions.
12. Based on the above facts, the Complainants allege that the Republic of Mauritania is in violation of Articles 1 (Obligation of State Parties), 3 (Non-Discrimination), 4 (Best Interests of the Child), 5 (Survival and Development), 11 (Education), 12 (Leisure, Recreation, and Cultural Activities), 15 (Protection from Economic Exploitation), 16 (Protection Against Harmful Social and Cultural Practices) and 29 (Prevention of Sale, Trafficking and Abduction of Children) of African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
iv. The African Committee’s Analysis on Decision of Admissibility
13. The ACERWC notes that the current Communication is submitted pursuant to Article 44 of the ACRWC which allows the Committee to receive and consider complaints from “any person, group or nongovernmental organization recognized by the Organization of the African Unity, Member States, or the United Nations on matters covered by [the Charter]”. The Complainants, therefore, have submitted that they have the competence to submit the communication as a recognized Non- Governmental Organisations. The Complainants also stated that the communication is directed against a State Party to the African Children’s Charter, as the Respondent State ratified the ACRWC on 21 September 2005, and the alleged violations of the rights enshrined in the Charter have allegedly been committed in the jurisdiction of the Respondent State.
14. The Committee also notes that MRG is an international human rights organization registered in the UK and SOS-Esclaves is a Non- Governmental Organization based in Mauritania. Moreover, it is also noted that the Communication is submitted on matters covered under the ACRWC. Therefore, the Committee is of the view that the Complainants have the capacity to submit a Communication in accordance with Article 44 of the ACRWC.
15. As provided under Section II and Section IX of the Revised Communication Guidelines, the admissibility of a communication submitted pursuant to Article 44 is subject to conditions relating to authorship, form and content as considered below.
16. Section I (3) of the Revised Guidelines on Consideration of Communications by the ACERWC (the Revised Communication Guidelines)provides a communication may be presented on behalf of a child victim without her/his agreement on condition that the complainant is able to show that her/his action is taken in the supreme interest of the child. The Complainants have submitted the communication on behalf of Mauritanian children; Said Ould Salem who is 16 years old and Yarg Ould Salem who is 13 years old, whose rights under the Charter have been violated by the Respondent State.
17. The Committee notes that the communication explicitly states the names of the authors, which are recognised Non-Governmental Organizations; and the complaint is submitted on behalf of Said Ould Salem and Yarg Ould Salem, Mauritanian children in the Respondent State. In addition, the Committee notes that the Complainants have provided arguments that the submission is made in the best interests of the victims. Therefore, the Committee holds the view that the Complainants have complied with Section 1(3) of the Revised Communication Guidelines.
18. The Complainants submit that the present Communication satisfies the requirement as to form as set out in Section 2 (2) of the Revised Communication Guidelines, which states that a Communication can only be considered by the Committee if it is not anonymous, it is written in one of the official languages of the Committee, it concerns a State Party to the Charter and it is duly signed by the applicant or her/his representatives. In this regard, the Committee is of the view that the Author of the Communication has been identified and relevant details of the Communication have been provided to the Committee. The Communication is written in English which is one of the official languages of the Committee and it is made against a State Party to the Charter. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the Complainants have complied with the requirement of form as laid down in the Communication Guidelines.
19. Laying down requirements as to the content of a communication, Section IX (1) (a) of the Revised Communication Guidelines prescribes that a Communication has to be compatible with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union or with the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The Complainants submitted that this condition is satisfied since the Communication is presented pursuant to Article 44 of the African Children’s Charter in order to strengthen the observance of the ACRWC’s provisions in Mauritania and to contribute to the establishment of a vibrant, legally coherent African children’s rights regime. The Committee notes that the communication is compatible with the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Charter as it concerns alleged violations of the provisions of the Charter. In this regard, the Committee makes reference to the Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission/ACHPR) in the case Frederick Korvah v. Liberia[1] which sets the jurisprudence that for the content of the Communications to be considered compatible with the concerned instrument, it suffices to prove that the applicant invokes provisions of the particular law which are presumed to have been violated. Therefore, it is the Committee’s position that the Communication meets the requirements under Section IX (1) (a) of the Revised Communications Guidelines.
20. The Committee also notes that the communication is presented in a professional, polite and respectful language, making it compatible with Section IX (1) (F) of the Revised Communication Guidelines.
21. Pursuant to Section IX (1) (b) of the Revised Communication Guidelines, a communication should not be exclusively based on information circulated by the media. The Committee has learned that the factual basis of the present Communication rests on the information gathered through a direct contact between SOS-Esclaves and a local lawyer with the two boys, as well as from country visits by Minority Rights Group International to Mauritania and meetings with the two boys. Therefore, the Committee is of the view that the alleged facts are not solely based on information circulated by the media; hence it satisfies the requirement under Section IX (1) (b) of the Revised Communication Guidelines.
22. According to Section IX (1) (C) of the Communication Guidelines, a communication shall not raise matters pending settlement or previously settled by another international body or procedure in accordance with any legal instruments of the African Union and principles of the United Nations Charter. As far as the inquiry made by the Committee goes, the Communication under consideration does not raise matters pending settlement or previously settled by another international body or procedure in accordance with any legal instruments of the Africa Union and principles of the United Nations Charter. In this regard and as part of the investigation, the Committee officially requested the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ACHPR if the matter in the Communication at hand has ever been brought to their attention. In its response, the ACHPR informed the Committee that the matter has never been presented to the Commission. Consequently, the Committee holds the view that the Communication has complied with the requirement in Section IX (1) C) of the Revised Communication Guidelines.
23. Section IX (1) (d) of the Revised Communication Guidelines provides that the author of a communication should exhaust all available and accessible local remedies before it brings the matter to the Committee. The issue of exhaustion of local remedies requires further explanation. As the ACERWC elucidated in its previous decisions, the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is only applicable with regards to remedies, which are 'available, effective and sufficient'.[2] As the Commission clarified in many of its decisions, a remedy is considered to be available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment or if he/she can make use of it in the circumstances of his/her case. According to the Commission, “the word 'available' means 'readily obtainable; accessible'; or 'attainable, reachable; on call, on hand, ready, present; convenient, at one's service, at one's command, at one's disposal, at one's beck and call'. In other words, remedies, the availability of which is not evident, cannot be invoked by the State to the detriment of the Complainant[3] The Commission defined the word ‘effective’ as “adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the intended or expected) result,” or ‘functioning, useful, serviceable, operative, in order; practical, current, actual, real, valid’”[4] As the Commission underscored, a remedy is effective if it offers a prospect of success. If its success is not sufficiently certain, the remedy cannot meet the requirements of availability and effectiveness.[5] A remedy is considered to be sufficient if it is capable of redressing the complaint.
24. In the matter at hand, the Complainants indicated that the Respondent State has enacted penal laws that criminalise holding persons as slaves. On its face value, Mauritania's legal and institutional framework appears to offer protection against slavery. The adoption, on 3 September 2007, of the Slavery Act criminalizing slavery and punishing slavery-like practices appeared as a significant step in combating against. However, various reports show that there is lack of effective implementation of this law. For instance, in 2014, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery noted that “the enforcement of the 2007 anti-slavery law relies solely upon the police and judiciary, who have shown a reluctance to follow up on allegations of slavery-like practices, with most cases being closed without any proper investigation."[6] Similarly, in its 2014/15 Report, Amnesty International reported that implementation of the anti-slavery law in practice remained poor, stating that "court cases were subject to long delays."[7] Amnesty International further indicated that between 2010 and the end of 2014, at least six cases of slavery were submitted to the Public Prosecutor but no ruling on any of them had been made by the end of 2014.[8]
25. This shows that seeking a criminal conviction of one's slave master and obtaining compensation for one's deprivation of liberty, which exists in theory, is not effective in practice. In defining “effective remedy”, the Commission emphasized that the remedy should be practical, current, actual, real and valid to be considered as effective remedy.[9] According to the Commission, the remedy, which exists in theory but not in practice, cannot be considered to be effective. Moreover, as the Council of Europe in its practical guide on admissibility criteria underscored, "the existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice. ”[10]
26. Dealing on similar issues, the ACERWC, in the Center for Human Right and other on behalf of Talibes v. Senegal case, held the view that: ‘while it was apparent that penal laws were in existence proscribing the practice of forcing children to beg, Senegal had made little effort to enforce such provisions: as of 2011, only 10 cases had been brought resulting in 9 convictions but with the duration of imprisonment being minimal. In such circumstances, this Committee was of the view that the avenue of pursuing a criminal complaint was inefficient’.[11] Similarly, in the present communication, the Committee concurs with the Complainants submission that ‘any remedies that may be available in theory under the 2007 Act, under which there has only been one conviction to date with a sentence not meeting the minimum prescribed by law, are neither effective nor sufficient in practice.’
27. In their submission, the Complainants argued that it is not the obligation of victims but that of the Respondent State’s to move criminal process forward. According to the Complainants, victims of human rights violations (where are considered as criminal offences under a State's domestic laws) have little control over the criminal process. In this regard, the ACHPR has consistently ruled that: ‘Whenever there is a crime that can be investigated and prosecuted by the State on its own initiative, the State has the obligation to move the criminal process forward to its ultimate conclusion. In such cases, one cannot demand that the complainants or the victims or their family members assume the task of exhausting domestic remedies when it is up to the State to investigate the facts and bring the accused persons to court in accordance with both domestic and international fair trial standards.’[12] Instead, by failing to properly investigate a criminal matter of which it has been notified and to move the criminal process forward to its ultimate conclusion within a reasonable time, a State ‘forfeit[s] its prerogative to deal with the matter domestically.’[13]
28. In the matter at hand, four years have lapsed since an appeal was lodged by the State Prosecutor against the decision of the Criminal Court of Nouakchott. However, after four years, no decision was given on the file lodged by the prosecutor. This indicates that the Respondent State failed to properly investigate a criminal matter of which it has been notified and to move the criminal process forward to its ultimate conclusion within a reasonable time. Consequently, the Committee believes that the two boys in the present case cannot be expected to assume the task of exhausting domestic criminal remedies but that it is instead for the Respondent State to move the criminal process forward to its ultimate conclusion in a timely manner, which it has failed to do.
29. In the Communication of children of Nubian descents V Kenya, the Committee took the view that “the Complainants can be exempted from exhausting local remedies if such an attempt would be or is unduly prolonged, which is an explicitly mentioned exception under Article 56[5] of the African Charter.”[14] The Committee further underscored that “an unduly prolonged domestic remedy cannot be considered to fall within the ambit of ‘available, effective, and sufficient’ local remedy.”[15] In the present matter, the Committee has learned that the victims have not caused the delay, and indeed through their lawyer they have repeatedly sought to ensure a hearing of the appeal. The Committee notes that four years have lapsed by the time the Complainants lodged this communication. As it is noted in the Children of Nubian Descendants Communication “a year in the life of a child is almost six percent of his or her childhood... the implementation and realization of children’s rights in Africa is not a matter to be relegated for tomorrow, but an issue that is in need of proactive immediate attention and action.” The Committee is of the view that, the delay caused in relation to the present communication is not in the best interest of the child and amounts to undue delay that triggers the exception to the requirement to exhaust any local remedies.
30. Pursuant to Section IX (1) (E) of the Revised Communication Guideline, the Communication should be presented within a reasonable period after exhaustion of local remedies at the national level. The Committee is of the view that this requirement is fulfilled since this Communication is brought within a reasonable period of time, after waiting for four years to get remedy from local arena.
31. On the basis of the above arguments and analysis, the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child notes and concludes that the Communication submitted by the authors has fulfilled all the admissibility conditions as laid down in the Committee’s Guidelines on Consideration of Communication; and it is accordingly declared admissible.
vi. Submissions on the Merits of the Communication
The Complainants’ Submission on the Merits
32. The Complainants’ allegations are based on the fact that Mauritania has failed to adequately and effectively enforce the 2007 law criminalizing slavery and to ensure that the members of the family who have held the two boys in slavery were charged with offences and received sentences and punishments commensurate to the seriousness of their actions.
33. The Complainants argue that Mauritania has failed to ensure that the appeal against the unduly lenient sentences and the amount of compensation awarded is heard promptly; and has failed to ensure that the absconded slave master is located and brought to justice.
34. The Complainants submit that through its failure to adequately enforce the provisions of the 2007 anti-slavery law in respect of those who held the two boys in slavery, the Government of Mauritania is in breach of its negative and positive obligations in relation to various rights under the Charter. The complainants therefore argue that the Government is necessarily in breach of its duty under article 1 (obligation to take measures) of the Charter.
35. The Applicants submit that the difference in treatment faced by Said and Yarg in respect of their rights amounts to discrimination. In this regard, the Complainants submit that the Respondent State assumes the responsibility of preventing and investigating acts of discrimination, and punishing perpetrators with a view to ensuring redress to the victims. In the same token, the Complainants argue that the treatment of Said and Yarg and the failure of the Government to prevent such treatment and provide effective remedy violated their rights to education, survival and development, leisure, recreation, and cultural activities, protection form economic exploitation, protection against harmful social and cultural practices, and protection from sale, trafficking and abduction of children. The Complainants further argued that the delay in the court proceedings is a violation of the best interest of the child.
The Respondent State’s Submission on the Merits
36. The Respondent State submitted that the legislative framework of Mauritania provides a solid basis for the protection of children against abuse and all forms of exploitation; specific protection measures indicated include act 2003-025 on the Trafficking in Persons and act 2015-031 which strengthened the protection in relation to slavery and slavery-like practices on minors. The Respondent State indicated that in the law of Mauritania no one can be subject to slavery, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. According to the Respondent State, these practices clearly constitute crimes against humanity and are punishable by the law. It was also the Respondent State’s submission that in 2014, the Mauritanian Government, reiterating its commitment towards implementing the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations against contemporary forms of slavery, has adopted a roadmap which outlines a series of concrete measures which are deemed to be taken to address the challenges of slavery and slavery like practices in the Country.
37. The Respondent State further stated that Mauritania is in the process of developing a plan of action against child labor in partnership with the International Labor Organisation to combat the exploitation of children. Among the key activities of this Action Plan was the adoption Act 2015- 031 on 10 September 2015, which amended the 2007 Slavery Act, and makes slavery a crime against humanity, imprescriptible and aggravates the penalty. The 2015 Act also established specialized courts, which have been created in each area to support more effectively the claims brought against slavery.
38. The Respondent State also submitted that beyond taking legislative measures, other appropriate measures have been taken to enable the victims of slavery to get civil status, through which Said and his brother Yarg have benefited from ease of enrolment into schools.
39. The Respondent State further informed the ACERWC that the Government of Mauritania undertook the necessary measures to prosecute the El Hussain family without reluctance. The Respondent State argued that the granting of bail to Ahmed Ould Hassine was done after several requests and contrary to opposition by the public prosecutor. On 22 June 2011 and 25 January 2012 Ahmed Ould Hassine requested for bail and was denied because of the seriousness of the alleged offences. After 11 months of detention, bail was granted by the criminal chamber of the Supreme Court despite the constant opposition by the Public Prosecutor owing to the gravity of the offence in question.
40. The Respondent State submitted that, basic education is compulsory and free. Act 2001-054 imposes the schooling of children up to the age of 14 years. Measures are being taken to reduce the disparities in school enrolment in geographic areas where disadvantaged groups exist.
41. The Respondent State evasively denied all the allegations of the violations of the rights of Said and Yarg under the Charter; by submitting that there is no phenomenon of slavery in Mauritania and indicating the due diligence of the Government of Mauritania in responding to the challenges faced by Said and Yarg by prosecuting El Hassin family and according social protection mechanisms to the children.
42. On 7 October 2016, Anti-Slavery International, a London-based INGO that has over 20 years working experience in the Respondent State, applied to be allowed to make third party intervention submissions. The third party intervener submitted that many descendants of slaves in the Respondent State remain in slavery to this day, under the full control of their traditional masters. They are treated as property, and receive no payment for their work. Men primarily herd cattle or work on their masters’ farmland, while women are mostly engaged in domestic work, carrying and nursing the master’s children and often shepherding animals. Girls and boys start work for their masters a very young age, the domestic duties include fetching water from wells, collecting firewood, cooking washing clothes, cleaning, caring for the children of their master, and setting up and moving tents. It was also submitted that the children of slaves are considered the masters’ property and, like other slaves, can be rented out, loaned, given as gifts in marriage or inherited by the masters’ children.
43. Anti-Slavery International submitted that the total destitution in which children in Mauritania find themselves leaves them highly vulnerable to further exploitation (including sexual exploitation). Girls in slavery are often subjected to rape and sexual violence, and other men they encounter on leaving slavery may also view them and treat them as sexual property. Additionally, girls may have children themselves, which involves additional economic and care responsibilities and stigma. For those who do find sources of support in the short-term (usually family members who are no longer in slavery, or anti-slavery organizations), the lack of identity documents creates a huge barrier to access State services. In this regard, it was further submitted that to obtain ‘civil status’, the applicant must provide parents’ details, which are often unknown to children who are victims of slavery. As a result, children therefore have difficulty accessing education; they are often years behind other children, so need time to catch up before they can integrate into formal schools, but public schooling beyond the age of 10 is only available to those with identity cards. This perpetuates children’s social isolation and disempowerment; it prevents their access to the key opportunity to break the generational cycle of poverty and exploitation.
viii. Issues for investigation by the ACERWC
44. Following the arguments made by all the parties involved in the Communication, the ACERWC has framed the following issues as matters of deliberation and investigation with a view to informing its Decision:
i. Whether the Respondent State has failed to discharge its obligation, under the principle of the best interest of the child, in effectively and promptly prosecuting the perpetrators of the individuals involved in the alleged violations of the rights of the two children, Said Ould Salem and Yarg Ould Salem;
ii. Whether the Respondent State has violated the various rights and obligations as they are prescribed in the African Children’s Charter, and as they are related to the two brothers Said Ould Salem and Yarg Ould Salem; the rights and obligations include education, survival and development, leisure, recreation, and cultural activities, protection from economic exploitation, protection against harmful social and cultural practices, and prevention of sale, trafficking and abduction of children; and
iii. In cases where the Respondent State has not found in compliance with its obligations as they are prescribed in the African Children’s Charter, what remedies are the victims entitled for.
ix. The Committee’s analysis on the merits of the alleged violations
Alleged violation of article 1 on general measures of implementation
45. Article 1 of the African Children’s Charter provides for the obligation of State Parties with respect to the provisions of the Charter. According to Article 1 of the African Children’s Charter, State Parties are expected to take legislative and other measures such as administrative or judicial measures to realize the rights of children enumerated under the Charter.
46. As part of the Respondent State’s obligation under article 1, the Committee notes that the Government of Mauritania is under legal obligation to take legislative and other measures in protecting children from acts of slavery and its inevitable consequences.
47. The Committee notes that the obligation ‘to take legislative measures’ recognises actions to promote and protect the rights of the child and needs a clear foundation in national legislation, as well as accompanying policies and guidance that support its implementation. This in turn requires the enactment and continuous review of national legislation and related administrative guidance to ensure their compatibility with relevant international norms and related standards on the rights of the child.
48. It is also the Committee’s stance that implementation of the obligation as to ‘legislative measure’ should be viewed in light of child protection approach. Legislation which underscores the right of children to protection from all forms of abuse, neglect, maltreatment and degradation is a necessary element of the fulfillment of the obligation provided under article 1 of the Charter. The legislations should also contain the entire array of protective measures, which shall include effective procedures for the establishment of special monitoring units to provide support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up in instance of child abuse and neglect.
49. With regard to the obligations of taking ‘other measures’, the Committee at the outset notes that it is an overarching obligation, which also requires a legislative basis for its implementation. ‘Other measures’ should therefore not be seen as entirely separate from legislative measures. In this regard, the Committee focuses on administrative and judicial measures that State Parties are obliged to undertake with a view to protect and promote children’s rights.
50. The Committee notes that administrative measures are broad as they cover a wide range of actions such as allocating sufficient resource, coordination, and collaboration with other stakeholders. For instance, considering the multi-sectoral nature of children’s rights, State Parties should take in to account the fact that it is almost impossible to implement the obligations under the African Children’s Charter fully under a single agency. In this regard, the overarching responsibility of governments is therefore to put in place a child rights governance system that ensures the visibility, advancement and realisation of all children’s rights across the full implementation processes of all role players. Further, State Parties should also design and implement child sensitive national budgeting by developing and using tools for making children visible in budgetary processes at the national and sub-national levels, including in the context of international cooperation, and in the context of regional economic imperatives.
51. Regarding ’judicial measures’ the Committee notes that State Parties should provide for judicially enforceable children’s rights with a view to ensuring that children have access to the judicial system, if needs be without parental assistance, to enable them to enforce their rights. The Committee also endorses the need for the establishment of child-friendly procedures as well as appropriate compensation in cases of breach of the rights of children.[16]
52. Following the above discussion, the Committee also approaches the implementation of the obligations of State Parties as it is included in article 1 of the Charter in the context of the requirement of ‘due diligence’. The Committee notes that while discharging their human rights obligations, States are obliged to show due diligence to ensure the full realization of human rights.[17] States’ due diligence is translated in the form of prevention of human rights violations, investigation of violations, prosecution of perpetrators, and ensuring punishment of perpetrators.[18] In order to prevent violation of human rights, States must therefore identify vulnerable groups prone to abuse and take special measures to prevent violence from occurring. In cases where the violence has already occurred, Governments are required to undertake exhaustive investigation and ensure that commensurate compensation is rewarded to the victims.[19] In the event where the State fails to show due diligence to prevent or investigate violence perpetrated by third parties, it assumes responsibility under international law for non-state actors.[20] In this regard, all organs of the State are required to act in due diligence and a breach caused by any of the organs of the Government in preventing and investigating a violation makes the State responsible under its international human rights obligations.[21] As the Inter American Court of Human Rights alluded, a state is in violation of its duties ‘when the State allows private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention’[22] (in this case the African Children’s Charter).
53. In the matter at hand, the Committee’s decision should hence be based on the assessment of the due diligence of the Respondent State. Put differently, the issue is whether or not the Government of Mauritania acted in due diligence in discharging its obligation towards Said and Yarg in terms of prevention, investigation, prosecution, punishment, and remedy by taking legislative and other measures. This begs the question as to what determines if States have acted in due diligence or not.
54. International human rights jurisprudence including that of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights suggests that human rights obligation of States are that of obligation of result, not obligation of diligence.[23] Therefore, the Committee is of the view that the due diligence of the Respondent State is assessed by the result it has achieved through the legislative and other measures it has taken in relation to the respective issue. Of course, the Respondent State is not always breaching its obligation whenever there is a violation of rights; rather the State is said to be in violation of international duties when it has failed to undertake an objective and government driven investigation towards the violation.[24] If a State is found to be in complicity by overlooking or condoning a certain pattern of violence, the State has not shown due diligence to ensure the realization of human rights.[25] Moreover, it is the duty of the Respondent State to prove that it has shown due diligence in implementing the laws or redressing the alleged violation. Even though burden of proof lies on the Applicants, jurisprudence suggests that unless the State proves the contrary of what has been alleged, the Committee considers the allegation of the Complainants to be true.[26]
55. The Complainants allege that the Respondent State is in violation of its obligation under article 1 of the African Children’s Charter by failing to prevent violation of the rights of Said and Yard through its inaction, and failing to enforce the 2007 Slavery Act to prosecute and punish the former slave masters and mistresses. The Committee notes with appreciation the legislative measures the State Party has adopted including the 2015 AntiSlavery Act, which criminalizes slavery. Nevertheless, the Respondent State has not indicated the specific measures it has been undertaking to prevent slavery and to free children who are under slavery. The case concerning Said and Yard was brought before the domestic courts after the aunt of the children conveyed an application. The lower court only convicted Ahmed Ould El Hassine for the crime of slavery but left the other family members with impunity. Furthermore, its decision sentenced Ahmed Ould El Hassine to 2 years of imprisonment, which is less than the minimum years of imprisonment provided in the 2007 Slavery Act.
56. The Committee found from its fact-finding mission that the appeal has been considered by the appellate court and a decision in favor of the two victims has been given. Even though the situation of the two children has improved currently, this does not relieve the Respondent State from being accountable for the violation Said and Yard faced during the time of slavery, by lack of appropriate prosecution, and prolonged court proceeding. A change in the status of victims for better does not change the status in relation to the ‘accountability of the government in terms of the act of violation committed against human rights’.[27]
57. Concerning the decision of the lower court and the prolonged appeal, the Respondent State argued that the judiciary has its independence in handling cases and hence other organs may not interfere in proceedings. The Committee views the State apparatus as one entity. All organs of the Government have a duty to respect, protect and fulfill the rights recognized under the Charter. Moreover, States may not invoke their internal Government structures as a justification for their failure to meet their obligations under the Charter. In this regard the Committee shares the view of the UN Human Rights Committee in that “the executive branch that usually represents the State Party internationally...may not point to the fact that an action ... was carried out by another branch of government as a means of seeking to relieve the State Party from responsibility.”[28]
58. As aforementioned, the duty of due diligence is measured by result and requires prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment. The Committee notes that the Government of Mauritania has taken legislative and other measures to criminalize slavery and prosecute the El Hassin family. However, the measures taken by the Government fall short of preventing the violations of the rights of Said and Yarg, which took place for more than 11 years. The Committee further notes that the investigation was not State driven as the aunt of the victims took the initiative to bring the case to the attention of the police and the appeal was also initiated by the lawyer of the victims. Moreover, the investigation and court proceeding was unduly prolonged and contrary to the best interest of the child as indicated in the admissibility ruling of this decision. With regards to prosecution and punishment, the Committee finds that the Respondent State has not shown due diligence to prosecute all the perpetrators of the violations, furthermore the one that was prosecuted has been released on bail and the police are not able to locate him. Such failure on the part of the Respondent State reflects ignorance that leaves perpetrators with impunity and does not send a deterring massage for other slave masters. Therefore, due to lack of due diligence in preventing the enslavement of Said and Yarg, taking proactive measures to investigate the violation and effectively prosecute and punish all perpetrators, as well as failing to ensure effective remedy to the victims, the Committee finds the Respondent State in violation of its obligation under article 1 of the African Children’s Charter which requires it to take all the necessary measures possible to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the rights enumerated in the Charter.
Alleged violation of article 3 on non-discrimination
59. Article 3 of the African Children’s Charter provides that “Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child’s or his/her parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.” The Complainants alleged that the two brothers were treated differently from other children in their former master’s house. They were held as slaves, required to work seven days a week without pay, without rest, were not allowed to attend school and were not afforded time for play. It was further alleged that the discrimination the children has faced resulted in violation of their right to development, education, leisure, their right not to be subjected to child labor as well as their right not to be subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment. The Complainants also stated that while other children in the house were referred to with their names, the two brothers were simply called ‘slave’. The Applicants further alleged that the differential treatment to which the two boys were subjected was solely based on the fact that they belonged to the Haratine ethnic group, who are victims of slavery in Mauritania.
60. Moreover, the Committee, from the records of the hearing, learned that Said and Yarg testified that they are subjected to different treatment which amounts to discrimination. Both from the submissions of the Complainants and the testimony of the two brothers, the Committee noted that the two brothers were treated differently than the other children in the household due to their status as slaves.
61. Following the submissions, the Committee deliberated on whether the different treatment that the two brothers have been subjected to amounts to discrimination or not. The Committee shares the view that for a differential treatment to be justified “the reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate State interest and limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained”.[29] The Committee notes that slavery is clearly prohibited under the national law of Mauritania and various international human rights laws. In the matter at hand the differential treatment that Said and Yarg have been subjected to emanates from the fact that they are considered as slaves of the El Hassin family, and that does not in any way justify the different treatment; hence it amounts to discrimination under the Charter.
62. The Committee then proceeded in analysing the legal responsibility of the Respondent State taking the fact that the act of discrimination was committed by private individuals. It is the Committee’s view that the Respondent State has the duty to protect children from discrimination in the enjoyment of their rights in the Charter. The duty to protect has two limbs. The first is the duty to take preventive measures against occurrences of violations of human rights by private actors; and the second is the duty to take remedial measures once the violations have occurred.[30] In line with the preventive aspect of the duty to protect, States ‘must take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and carry out investigation to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim’s adequate compensation .
63. In the Communication at hand, Said and Yarg were facing discriminatory treatment in the exercise of their rights recognized in the Charter by the members of the El Hassin family for 11 years until they escaped from the house. Even though the Government ratified international treaties and enacted laws that protect children like Yarg and Said from discriminatory treatment, such laws were not effectively implemented to their benefit. The failure by the Government to effectively implement laws and its inability to prevent the discriminatory treatment of Said and Yarg is a violation of the duty to protect under Article 3 of the African Children’s Charter.
64. Moreover, the Committee shares the position that the duty to protect extends to conducting investigation, identifying those responsible for the violation, imposing punishment and providing effective remedy to the victims, when the right is violated.[31] The effectiveness of a remedy can be measured by its proportionality to the harm caused and its timeliness. In the Communication at hand, the Government prosecuted only few members of the El Hassin Family and only one of them (Ahmed Ould El Hassine) was convicted for the crime of enslavement that resulted in the discriminatory treatment. However, all the members of the family participated in the discriminatory treatment of the brothers, ended up with impunity. Additionally the judicial remedy was unduly prolonged, placing the victims in a legal limbo. Furthermore, the Government did not provide Said and Yarg with the necessary support to integrate them in to the society to ensure their equal enjoyment of rights under the Charter. Hence, the Committee concludes that the failure of the Government to prevent the discriminatory treatment in the enjoyment of rights recognized under the Charter, as well as the failure to provide effective remedy is a violation of the Respondent State’s duty to protect the right to non-discrimination under article 3.
65. The Committee also deliberated on the Applicant’s submission regarding Mauritania’s breach of its negative obligation to respect, by systematically failing to enforce the 2007 anti-slavery law. The Committee notes that the duty to respect requires states to refrain from interfering with or inhibiting the exercise of a right. In this regard, it is the Committee’s view that the Complainants could not provide sufficient evidence which proves that the Respondent State directly interfere in the enjoyment of the rights to nondiscrimination of the two brothers. Hence, the Committee is not in a position to pronounce that the Respondent State has breached its duty to respect the right to non-discrimination.
Alleged violation of article 4 on the best interest of the child
66. The best interest of the child, as provided in article 4 of the African Children’s Charter, should be the primary consideration in all actions involving and affecting children. The Committee considers the best interest of the child to be one of the general principles which guide the interpretation and implementation of the rights contained in the Charter. The principle of the best interest of the child is applicable in all actions or omissions undertaken by any person including State and non-State actors.[32] In addition, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) indicated that the best interest of the child has a procedural content in the sense that the decisions concerning children should be made after assessing the possible implication on the rights and welfare of the child.[33] Hence all actions and inactions that concern children must be undertaken only if they are in the best interest of the child.[34] The Committee concurs with the UNCRC that the best interest of the child is flexible and adaptable so that it can be applied to the needs of children taking into account their specific circumstances.[35]
67. In the current Communication, the Complainants alleged that Mauritania has contravened article 4 of the Charter on the best interest of the Child as it failed to implement its anti-slavery law; to bring prompt action against the slave masters of Said and Yarg; to bring charges against all persons involved in the slavery; and to hear the appeal on time.
68. In assessing the best interest of Said and Yarg, the Committee pays due regard to factors such as their identity, protection of their rights, and vulnerability as suggested by the UNCRC?7 Said and Yarg are born to a slave mother which automatically placed them in the situation of slavery or slavery like practices. This puts the two children in a vulnerable situation requiring the Respondent State to take special measures of protection. In the present Communication, the Respondent State has taken legislative measures to address the scourge of slavery and slavery like practices, however, it has not taken sufficient administrative measures to prevent slavery or slavery like practices and protect the rights of children affected by slavery or slavery like practices. This is further accompanied by lack of prosecution of all persons who involved in the servitude of Said and Yarg, lenient sentence against the slave master, and a prolonged appeal procedure, which has left Said and Yard with no compensation.
69. The failure of the Respondent State to duly investigate and prosecute all perpetrators of slavery or slavery like practices, and the decision of the lower courts which opted for a lower sentence than the minimum sentence prescribed in the 2007 Slavery Act does not serve the best interest of Said and Yarg as well as other children who are in the situation of slavery or slavery like practices. Moreover, a prolonged decision even if it favors the victims could lead to a violation of substantive rights.[36] Ensuring the best interest of the child necessitates that procedural safeguards must be established including prioritizing children’s issues and completing decisions in the shortest time possible.[37] It follows from this that the failure of the Appellate Court to hear the appeal timely is also not in the best interest of the child.
70. Therefore, the Committee finds that the Respondent State is in violation of article 4 of the African Children’s Charter by failing to prioritize the best interest of Said and Yard in the investigation and prosecution of their slave masters as well as in the prolonged appeal.
Alleged violation of article 5 on survival and development
71. The African Children’s Charter provides that States Parties shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival, protection and development of the child. The right to survival and development encompasses all aspects of the development of the child as the physical and psychological wellbeing of the child are interrelated. The right to survival and development can only be realized through the implementation of all of the rights under the Charter including the right to health, education, protection from abuse and torture and child labor. In this regard, the Committee share the view of the UNCRC as it is stated in its General Comment that the physical health and physiological wellbeing of the child that are critical for the child’s development, “may be put at risk by adverse living conditions, neglect, insensitive or abusive treatment and restricted opportunities for realizing human potential.”[38]
72. The Committee notes the crucial link between child labor and child development. Child labor, in all its forms[39], severely impedes the overall development and wellbeing of a child. In the Communication at hand, Said and Yarg have been subjected to one of the worst forms of child labor, which is modern slavery or slavery like practices. They were treated as properties of the El Hassine family and were required to work long hours without pay, suffering physical and physiological abuse and deprived of education and recreation. It is the Committee’s view that the situation they were in severely limited their physical and psychological development and deprived them of their childhood.
73. In this regard, the Committee has deliberated on what would be the duty of the Respondent State in ensuring that the rights to survival and development of the two children are uphold. The Committee notes that the Respondent State has a duty to protect the survival and development of the child from encroachment by third parties. The duty to protect this right requires the Respondent State to ensure that the survival and development of the child by ensuring, inter alia, the right to education, health, nutrition, leisure and recreation are realized. The Respondent State has to also ensure that the child is protected from any form of abuse, violence and torture. Said and Yarg were in a situation that severely hindered their development throughout their childhood. The failure of the Respondent State to prevent this and to prosecute and punish all those involved in the enslavement of the children as well as to provide timely and adequate remedy to the children is contrary to the obligation of the Government of Mauritania under the Charter. Therefore, the Committee finds that the Respondent State has failed to holistically realize the rights under the Charter to ensure the survival and development of the Said and Yarg, thereby violating its duty under article 5(2) of the African Children’s Charter.
Alleged violation of article 11 on the right to education
74. State Parties’ obligation with respect to the right to education entails, among other things, the provision of free and compulsory basic education and undertaking special measures to ensure that disadvantaged children have equal access to education.[40] The compulsory aspect of education calls upon States to take positive measures to ensure that all children are enrolled in school. The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights expounded that the right to education entails elements of availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adaptability[41] The same Committee further specified that the obligation of States to ensure that the right to education is exercised without any discrimination is an immediate obligation and hence States need to take ‘deliberate, concrete, and targeted’ action to ensure the same.[42] Particularly, in events where the right holders are not in a position to enjoy the right to education by their own means, States are expected to take positive measures to provide for and fulfill the right to education.[43] Deprivation of access to education through exclusion is considered to be discrimination in education.[44] This does not change even when the exclusion is caused by private non-state actors. The right to education, as all other human rights, levies an obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfill.[45] The duty of States’ to protect the right to education includes the obligation to prevent and redress the exclusion of children from education caused by third parties.
75. The facts in the current Communication clearly demonstrate that Said and Yarg were not enrolled in school during the 11 years of slavery. Neither the Government of the Respondent State nor the El Hassine family took any step to enroll the two children in school. The Respondent State failed to employ the required effort to take special measures with a view to assisting Said and Yard to attend school during their stay in the El Hassine family or even after they were freed. It took Said and Yarg 4 years after their freedom to be enrolled in school. The Committee further notes from the Complainants’ submission that both children are currently attending private school as they were not able to attend public schools due to lack of identity documents. The Respondent State has also failed to appropriately and sufficiently redress the violence that was inflicted by the El Hassine family. The Committee therefore reaches on a conclusion that the Respondent State failed to ensure compulsory education for Said and Yarg, failed to take special measures to assist their vulnerability, and failed to protect their right to education from being violated by private parties. Accordingly, the Committee finds Government of Mauritania in violation of its obligations under article 11 of the African Children’s Charter.
Alleged violation of article 12 on leisure, recreation and cultural activities
76. The Committee notes that the role of leisure, recreation and cultural activities in the overall wellbeing of the child should not be underestimated. Considering its importance, article 12 of the African Children’s Charter recognizes the right of the child to rest and leisure, engage in play and recreational activities and participate in cultural activities. In this regard, the Committee joins the view of the UNCRC as it is pronounced in its General Comment. The UNCRC states that play and recreation are essential to the health and well-being of children and promote the development of creativity, imagination, self-confidence, self-efficacy, as well as physical, social, cognitive and emotional strength and skills’[46]Furthermore, the UNCRC states that ensuring such rights “contribute to all aspects of learning; they are a form of participation in everyday life and are of intrinsic value to the child, purely in terms of the enjoyment and pleasure they afford... Participation in cultural and artistic activities are necessary for building children’s understanding, not only of their own culture, but other cultures, as it provides opportunities to broaden their horizons and learn from other cultural and artistic traditions, thus contributing towards mutual understanding and appreciation of diversity... Rest and leisure are as important to children’s development as the basics of nutrition, housing, health care and education. Without sufficient rest, children will lack the energy, motivation and physical and mental capacity for meaningful participation or learning.”[47]
77. In the Communication at hand, the Applicants submitted that Said and Yarg were not allowed to play and rest adequately or pray. It was therefore argued that the treatment of the boys amounts to the denial of their right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities and this is a breach of the positive obligation of the Respondent State to protect children’s right. The Complainants further argue that the Respondent State has failed in its duty to protect this right by not adequately investigating and punishing those responsible for violating their rights.
78. Deliberating on the submissions, the Committee notes that the Respondent State is required to take the necessary measures to ensure that third parties do not interfere with the enjoyment of the right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities by children. The Committee learns that Said and Yarg were required to engage in domestic work all 7 days of the week without rest. From the testimony of the children during the hearing, the Committee also observed that the children used to be obliged to leave the house of the slave masters 4 O’clock in the morning every day to look after the camel herd and return to the house in the evening to prepare food before they go to bed. This has been the daily routine for the boys. Consequently, for eleven years Said and Yarg were denied of their right to play, rest and participate in cultural activities. This, according to the Committee clearly amounts to a denial of their childhood. The Committee therefore concludes that the Respondent State has violated its duty under article 12 of the Charter by failing to ensure that Said and Yarg are enjoying their right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities, contrary to what is prescribed under article 12 of the African Children’s Charter.
Alleged violation of article 15 on child labour
79. State Parties to the African Children’s Charter are obliged to take all the necessary measures to ensure that children are protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing hazardous works or works that affect their physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development both in the formal and informal sectors.[48] The Committee also shares the view that all forms of slavery and slavery like practices are considered to be worst forms of child labour pursuant to ILO Convention No 182.[49]
80. In the Communication at hand, the Committee notes that Said and Yarg have been placed in the El Hassine family to undertake herding and domestic chores seven days a week with no rest for the exploitation of their labour, which in accordance with the Committee amounts to contemporary form of slavery or slavery like practices.[50] The Committee stresses that the prohibition of slavery and slavery like practices has attained the status of customary international law and jus cogens norms.[51]The International Court of Justice has further established that States’ obligation to prohibit and eliminate slavery is an erga omnes obligation.[52] It therefore follows that States are not allowed to derogate from their obligation to prohibit slavery in any circumstances, and moreover, no justification is acceptable for the failure of States to prohibit slavery or slavery like practices.
81.lt is the Committee’s view that exploitative slavery practices against children impair their survival and development physically, intellectually, socially, spiritually, and morally. Furthermore, the Committee gives due regard to the interrelatedness and interdependence of children’s rights in considering the violation of article 15 of the Charter. The servitude of Said and Yarg in and by itself is a violation of article 15 of the African Children’s Charter and also it leads to other violations of the numerous provisions of the Charter such as the right to birth registration, access to health care and other basic services, family environment and so forth. Additionally, slavery or slavery like practices lead to violation of fundamental freedoms, right to movement, access to fair trial, and subject children to inhuman and degrading treatment.[53]
82. Given the legal status of the prohibition of slavery or slavery like practices and its long lasting impact on the rights and welfare of children, the Government of Mauritania is expected to take concrete and practical steps to prevent and abolish all slavery like practices that persist in its territory. Article 15 of the African Charter provides that children should be protected from economic exploitation and preforming work that is hazardous to their development. It further spells out 4 explicit measures States ought to take to protect children from child exploitation, which includes slavery and slavery like practices as discussed above. The measures are to;
A) provide through legislation, minimum age for admission to every employment;
B) provide for appropriate regulation of hours and conditions of employment;
C) provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of this article (article 15); and
D) promote the dissemination of information on the hazards of child labour to all sectors of the community.
1. .lt is of course noted that the Government of Mauritania has prohibited slavery by enacting the 2007 Slavery Act and later on an Anti-Slavery Act in 2015. While the Committee appreciates this as one step ahead towards the prohibition of slavery, more effort is required to practically eliminate slavery and slavery like practices as outlined under article 15 of the Charter.
84. In this regard, the Committee finds that the adoption of legislative measures is not a sufficient effort and that the Respondent State has failed to take other necessary measures to implement all components of article 15 of the Charter to free Said and Yarg, to ensure that their slave masters are appropriately penalized, and to ensure that Said and Yarg get a proper compensation. Therefore, the Committee decides that the Respondent State is in violation of its obligations under Article 15 (1) and 15(2)(c) of the Charter by failing to protect Said and Yarg from slavery or slavery like practices and by failing to ensure effective enforcement of prohibition of slavery or slavery like practices.
Alleged violation of article 16 on protection against child abuse and torture
85. Abuse and torture are among the practices strictly prohibited in the child protection systems. The African Children’s Charter, under Article 16, stipulates that State Parties shall take measures to protect children from all forms of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment and especially physical and mental injury or abuse, neglect and maltreatment, including sexual abuse. In this regard, State parties should take specific legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from abuse and torture. The measures taken by States must include preventive measures as well as intervention and prosecution in instances where child abuse and torture are taking place. The provision further provides that protective measures should include effective procedures for the establishment of special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have care of the child as well as other forms of prevention. The Charter also provides for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child abuse and neglect.
55 OHCHR Abolishing Slavery and its Contemporary Forms HR/PUB/02/4 (2002) p 8.
86. The Committee notes that abuse and torture can be both physical and physiological. As stated by the UNCRC, violence against children takes various forms including, neglect, mental violence, physical violence and corporal punishment.5® In the case of International Pen and Others v Nigeria, the African Commission stated that inhumane and degrading treatment includes ‘not only actions which cause serious physical and psychological suffering but which humiliate the individual or force him to act against his will or conscience.’[54]
87. The Committee reiterates that the condition under which Said and Yarg lived for more than 11 years amounts to contemporary slavery or slave like practices as they have been placed in the El Hassine family to undertake herding and domestic chores seven days a week with no rest for the exploitation of their labour.[55] During this time they were subjected to continuous beatings and mental abuse. They were referred to as slaves as opposed to their actual names and they were not allowed to pray or read the Quran. They were treated differently than other children in the house in every aspect of their lives, including health, education, play and nutrition. The Committee considers this treatment inflicted on them is degrading.
88. The wording of the African Children’s Charter is clear in providing that States should take various measures ‘to protect the child from all forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and especially physical or mental injury or abuse...’. Furthermore, the Committee is of the view that all forms of corporal punishment should be abolished, either in the home or any other setting. Contrary to this protection, the Respondent State failed in protecting Said and Yarg from physical and metal injury and abuse that was inflicted up on them and from the degrading treatment that they were subjected to. In addition to failing to prevent such an abuse on the children, the Respondent state has also failed to intervene and stop the violation. Furthermore, the Respondent State has failed to prosecute all those involved in the abuse of the children and render adequate and timely remedies to the children. By failing to prevent, intervene in and adequately prosecute and remedy the physical and mental abuse inflicted on Said and Yarg for 11 years, the Committee concludes that the Respondent State has violated its obligation to protect under article 16 of the Charter.
Alleged violation of article 21 on protection against harmful social and cultural practices
89. Article 21 of the African Children’s Charter obliges State Parties to take appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child. State Parties are particularly obliged to eliminate customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child and practices discriminatory to the child on the ground of sex or other status.
90. As cited in its decision in the Nubian case, the African Committee reiterates that according to the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, a harmful practice should, among other things, constitute a denial of the dignity and/or integrity of the individual and a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the two Conventions.[56]
91. As mentioned above child labor negatively affects the welfare, growth, and development of the child. As one of the worst forms of child labor, slavery impedes the overall wellbeing of the child. It is a practice that constitutes a total denial of the dignity and worth of the child. State Parties are under an obligation to take legislative, administrative and any other measure to eliminate harmful practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child; this includes eliminating slavery or slavery like practices in all its forms. The obligation of the Respondent State, in this regard, is therefore not that of conduct but of result.
92. The treatment of Said and Yarg affected their welfare, dignity, normal growth and development; it was prejudicial to their health and it was discriminatory. The Committee notes that this is not an isolated incident in Mauritania. In its fact-finding mission in Mauritania, the Committee has observed that the practice of slavery is widespread throughout the country with certain degree of variation. Even though the Respondent State has indicated the measures taken with regards to eliminating slavery in Mauritania, it was not sufficiently implemented to eliminate the practice and prevent the victimization of Said and Yarg. The two brothers were enslaved for 11 years without any intervention by the State; their eventual escape from slavery was through their own effort. The Committee hence finds that the failure of the Respondent State to eliminate the practice of slavery and the failure to protect Said and Yarg from this harmful practice is a violation of article 21 of the Charter.
Alleged violation of article 29 on Sale trafficking and abduction
93. Under Article 29 of the Charter, State Parties are obliged to take appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or the trafficking of children for any purpose or in any form by any person including parent and legal guardians. State Parties are further obliged to take appropriate measures to prevent the use of children in all forms of begging.
94. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children defines trafficking in persons as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation...’[57]
95. The Complainants in the current Communication submitted that trafficking is recognized as one form of slavery or slavery like practice, and that international human rights law standards applicable to Mauritania prohibit slavery in all its modern and traditional forms, of which trafficking is a particular example. The Complainants further argued that the provisions of article 29 of the Charter should be interpreted to include all forms of traditional and modern slavery or slavery like practices. By expanding article 29, the Complainants alleged that, it puts the Respondent state under an obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent slavery and similar practices. It can be concluded that the argument of the Complainants under this provision invokes sale, trafficking and abduction in as far as they relate to slavery and practices similar to slavery.
96. However, the Committee notes that the issue of slavery for the purpose of this case has been adequately dealt with under the provision of the Charter that prohibits child labor. Article 15 is interpreted to include worst forms of child labor, which includes slavery in all its forms. It is the Committee’s view that the Complainants failed to establish the relevance of the provision on sale, trafficking and abduction to the facts of the case. Hence, the Committee concludes that no sufficient legal and factual grounds have been established by the Complainants which put the Respondent State in violation of its obligation under article 29 of the Charter.
97. For the aforementioned reasons the African Committee finds the Respondent State in violation of its obligations under article 1 (obligation of states parties), article 3 (non-discrimination), article 4 (best interests of the child), article 5(survival and development), article 11 (education) article 12 (leisure, recreation and cultural activities), article 15 (child labour), article 16 (protection against child abuse and torture) and article 21 (protection against harmful social and cultural practices).
98. The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child therefore recommends for the Government of Mauritania to:
A) Ensure that all members of the El Hassin family are prosecuted for the enslavement of Said and Yarg and the violation of their rights to equality, survival and development, education, leisure, recreation and cultural activities, protection against child abuse and torture, and protection against child labor, and ensure that they receive sentences commensurate to the crimes committed pursuant to the laws of Mauritania;
B) Take measures to ensure that Said and Yarg obtain all the necessary documents including birth registration certificate and identity cards; this measure should further be extended to all children who find themselves in slavery or slavery like practices;
C) Ensure that they enjoy their right to education particularly by facilitating their enrolment in public schools within the shortest possible time;
D) Take special measures to support Said and Yarg in their education in order to accelerate their learning and development;
E) Provide psychosocial support to Said and Yarg in order to properly rehabilitate them from the physical and mental abuse they suffered, and reintegrate them in the society and to minimize to the maximum extent possible the negative psychological impact of their enslavement for 11 years;
F) Ensure that all involved in the servitude of Said and Yarg are prosecuted and that the conviction of the slave masters meets at least the minimum years of imprisonment prescribed in the Slavery Act;
G) Provide Said and Yarg with adequate compensation that is commensurate with the 11 years of slavery or slavery like practice they endured and all the above-mentioned violations of their rights;
H) Ensure the effective implementation of the 2015 anti-slavery law by ensuring the prosecution of perpetrators of slavery and slavery like practices; and other national strategies aiming at the elimination of slavery and slavery like practices;
I) Give due regard to the issue of slavery or slavery like practices and make the elimination of the same one of its priorities in issuing polices, allocating budget, and training human resources;
J) Undertake baseline survey to know the number children in slavery or slavery like practices and identify their situation to inform State intervention in the elimination of the practice as well as prosecution of perpetrators;
K) Take special measures to takeout children from slavery and slavery like practices and ensure that all children in such situations receive psychosocial, educational, as well as all forms of support needed to ascertain that they enjoy their rights as enshrined in the Charter;
L) Ensure that all the Government organs work in collaboration in issues involving slavery or slavery like practices and to this end give training to law makers, police, prosecutors, judges on the seriousness of slavery and the measure they should be taking to protect children from the scourge of modern slavery;
M) Undertake an accelerated campaign and sensitization to create awareness on the negative impacts of slavery or slavery like practices and its prohibition under national and international law to fast-track the elimination of slavery or slavery like practices in Mauritania within the shortest possible time;
N) Closely work with and support civil society and other stakeholders working in the eradication of slavery or slavery like practices in all its forms; and
O) Design child friendly mechanisms for reporting of instances of any form child abuse in the domestic setting and intervention means.
As per Section XXI (1) of the Revised Communication Guidelines of the Committee, the Government of Mauritania shall report to the Committee on all measures taken to implement the decision of the Committee within 180 days from the date of receipt of the Committee’s decision.
Done at the 30th Ordinary Session held in Khartoum, Sudan on 15
December 2017
Mrs Goitseone Nanikie Nkwe
Chairperson of the African Committee of Experts
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
31 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (n 3 above) para 174.
37 -•
As above para 55, 71, 75.
56 UNCRC General Comment 13 para 19-24.
[1] See African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Frederick Korvah v. Liberia, Communication No. 1/88 (1988) para 6
[2] See Institute for Human Right and Development in Africa (IHRDA and other on behalf of Children of Nubian descent v. Kenya, Communication No. Com/002/2009, para 28.
See Anuak Justice Council V Ethiopia Communication no. 299/2005, para 51.
[4] See Anuak Justice Council v. Ethiopia (n 3 above) para 52.
See Anuak Justice Council v. Ethiopia (n 4 above).
[6] United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Gulnara Shahinian: Follow-up mission to Mauritania, 27^ Session, A/HRC/27/53/Add.l, 26 August 2014, para 11.
[7] Amnesty International Report 2014/15: The State of the World's Human Rights. London: Amnesty International, 2015 p. 245. Available at: https://www.amnesty.orq/en/documents/poll0/0001/2015/en/
[8] Amnesty International (n 7 above). g
See Anuak Justice Council v. Ethiopia (n 4 above).
[10] Council of Europe/European Court of Human Right (2014) Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria para 72.
[11] Centre for Human Right and other on behalf of Talibes v Senegal Communication No. Com/001/2012, para 38
[12] African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 19 v Eritrea, Application No 275/2003, para 72. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Dr Farouk Mohamed Ibrahim v Sudan, Communication No.386/10, 19-25 February 2013.
Article 19 v Eritrea (n 11 above).
[14] See IHRDA and other on behalf of children of Nubian descent V Kenya (n 2 above) para 31.
[15] See IHRDA and other on behalf of children of Nubian descent V Kenya (n 2 above) para 32.
[16] UNCRC General Comment no 5 para 24.
[17] Zimbabwe Huma Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR) 2006 para 146.
[18] Velasquenz Rodriquez v Honduras July 29, 1988, ICtHR (ser c) No 4/1988para 166.
[19] Bousroual V Algeria Comm No 1588/2007 CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007 para 11.
[20] Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR (ACHPR 2001) para 57.
[21] UNHRC General Comment no 31 para 4.
[22] Velasquenz Rodriquez v Honduras July (n 3 above) para 176.
[23] Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence and Another v Cameroon (2009) AHRLR 47 (ACHPR 2009) para 110, 111 ; De Cubber v Belgium, application 9186/80, European Court of Human Rights, judgment, 26 October 1984 para 35.
[24] Velasquenz Rodriquez v Honduras (n 3 above) 177.
[25] Zimbabwe Huma Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR) 2006 para 160.
[26] Bousroual V Algeria (n 4 above) para 9.4.
[27] Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (2003) AHRLR (ACHPR 2003) para 40.
[28] UNHRC General Comment no 31 para 4.
Legal resources Foundation v. Zambia, Communication No. 211/98, para 67.
[30] S Manisuli General International Human Rights Law: Six Decades After the UDHR and Beyond (2010) 405.
As above.
[32] The Centre for Human Rights and La Rencontre Africaine Pour La Defense Des Droits De L’homme V Senegal, ACERWC Communication no. 003/Com/001/2012, 2015 para 35.
[33] UNCRC General Comment no 14 para 6(c).
[34] As above para 17.
[35] As above para 32.
30 Mazou v Cameroon (2001) AHRLR 8 (HRC 2001) para 8.4.
[37] UNCRC General Comment no 14 para 93.
[38] UNCRC General Comment 7 para 10.
[39] ILO Convention 182 article 3 and ILO Convention 190 article 3. According to ILO 182 all forms of slavery and practices similar to slavery are as classifies as worst forms of child labor to be eliminated without delay. Other forms of child labor in this category include the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom, forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict, the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances, the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs and work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
[40] ACRWC article 11(3)(a)&(e).
[41] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, Article 13: The Right to Education,1999, para 6.
[42] As above para 43.
[43] As above para 47.
4° UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education article 1.
[45] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, Article 13: The Right to Education, 1999, para 46.
[46] UNCRC General Comment 17 p2.
[47] * ।
As above.
[48] ACRWC article 15(1)(2).
[49] ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 (No. 182).
[50] Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery article 1(d).
[51] Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1963, vol. II, United Nations sales publication No.
63.V.2, pp. 198-199.
[52] Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1971, I.C.J.
Reports, 1970, p. 32.
[54] International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) para 79.
[55] Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery article 1(d).
[56] Joint general recommendation/general comment No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices November 2014 para 15.
[57] Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) art 3(a).
GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL
DECISION: No 003/Com/001/2012
Summary of Alleged Facts
1. On 27 July 2012 the Secretariat of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (henceforth, “the Committee”) received a communication, pursuant to Article 44(1) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (herein after, “the Charter"), submitted by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria (South Africa) and La Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de I’Homme (RADDHO) of Senegal (all of which shall be referred later as “the Complainants").
2. The Complainants are alleging that children as many as 100,000 (known as talibes), aged between 4 and 12 years, are sent away by their parents to live in Qur’anic schools known as daaras in the urban centres of the Republic of Senegal (henceforth, referred to as “the Respondent State”) allegedly to receive religious education. The Complainants allege that the situation depicts the difficulties that such children are facing in attaining government schooling.
3. The Complainants, moreover, allege that the talibes are forced by their instructors (known as marabouts^) to work on the streets as beggars. According to the Complainants, such forced child begging has been an on-going practice in the Respondent State since the 1980s, despite the existence of provisions in the Penal Code[2] outlawing the practice of forcing a child to beg.[3] These penal provisions have been reinforced by the Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices and to Protect Victims adopted by the Respondent State in 2005[4], which prescribes 5-10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of five to twenty million CFA francs for a person found guilty of forcing a child to beg.
4. According to the Complaints, despite the existence of these legislations, the Respondent State has made little efforts to enforce these provisions with a view to penalizing the marabouts who force talibes to beg, consequent to which as of 2011
' According to the Complainants, the marabouts are not generally trained as school teachers.
only 10 cases were brought to court resulting in nine convictions of marabouts. The Complaints submit that the highest actual duration of imprisonment for all convictions under the foregoing laws was one month imprisonment; which, according to them, represents a decrease in the severity of penalties imposed on the marabouts as compared to past years.
5. The Complainants also allege that the Respondent State’s Constitution (2001 )[5]allows only specific individuals under specific mandates to bring cases and only to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of any law. And, as such, there is no actio popularis in the Respondent State’s legal system. Cases for vindication of human rights violations may only be brought to court by individuals who have been directly affected by a violation and any decision will provide remedy only for those litigants, or for those who are directly connected to the case or have 'un interest et qualite pour agir’.
6. According to the Complainants, where a non-state agency wants to represent victims of violations of human rights, like the talibes in this matter, the consent of parents must first be obtained. The only other avenue to bring such a claim to court is to petition the Chief Prosecutor, whose decision is made discretionary and in consultation with the Minister responsible for justice.
7. In addition, the Complainants allege that the Respondent State has not provided minimum standards to regulate non-state schools and that it does not conduct inspections of the daaras to check if there are violations of the rights of the talibes attending schooling and living therein.
8. The Complainant allege further that the conditions in many daaras are deplorable; usually housed in unsafe and unhygienic structures where children sleep in overcrowded rooms or outside, with little or no access to clean water or sanitation. Talibes living in daaras rarely obtain enough food resulting in chronic malnourishment and frequently contract diseases where the marabouts do not provide the talibes with medical care or assistance. In some instances, according to the Complainants, the talibes are injured by speeding motor vehicles in the course of begging on the streets
9. The Complainants also allege that the talibes are required to bring a daily quota (in the form of rice, sugar or money) that they collected from begging in the streets to the daaras, failure to attain which results in beatings and punishments to defaulting talibes. On average, talibes spend between six and eight hours begging, which leaves them with less than five hours to spend on Qur’anic education per day. As result of their concentration on attaining their daily quotas, many talibes do not learn the Qur’an as it is contemplated.
10. Furthermore, the Complainants allege that the talibes are normally separated from living with their parents and are deprived of any contact with their families. The talibes are also physically assaulted and harshly punished when they attempt to leave the daaras.
11. The Complainants allege that, as a result of the foregoing situation and due to the failure by the Respondent State to protect the talibes, there are continuous violations of numerous rights and freedoms of such children, to which they are entitled under the Charter. It is the Complainants’ allegation that the Respondent State has violated, and continues to violate, the provisions of Article 4 (best interests of the child); Article 5 (the right to survival and development); Article 11 (the right to education); Article 12 (the right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities); Article 14 (the right to health and health services); Article 15 (prohibition of child labour); Article 16 (protection against child abuse and torture); Article 21 (protection against harmful social and cultural practices); and Article 29 (prohibition of sale, trafficking and abduction of children) of the Charter.
Admissibility
Complainants’ submission on admissibility
12. The Complainants have indicated that they have submitted the present Communication on behalf of the talibes in the Respondent State, whose rights under the Charter have been violated by the Respondent State. And, as such, they have the competence to do so under Chapter 2 Article 1(l)(2) of the Committee’s Communication Guidelines. The Complainants are of the view that they can submit the Communication even if the consent of the victims was not obtained since they are acting in the 'overall best interest of the child’. The Complainants further argue that the consent of the victims is not a requirement when there is evidence of serious, massive and systematic violations of the rights of talibes as it was indicated in Commission’s decision in Amnesty International v Sudan[6].
13. Concerning the form of the Communication, the Complainant submit that the present communication satisfies the requirement as to form as set out in Chapter 2 Article 1(H)(1) of the Communication Guidelines, which requires that a communication should not be anonymous; should be written; and should concern a State signatory to the Charter.
14. In relation to the content of the Communication, the Complainants submit that the communication has satisfied the requirements as to content as per Chapter 2 Article 1 (111)(1 )(a)(b)&(c) of the Communication Guidelines since the communication concerns violations of the provisions of the African Children’s Charter; it is not solely based on information circulated by the media; it has not been considered according to another investigation, procedure or international regulation.
15. The Complainants submit that exhaustion of local remedy in this matter is ‘unnecessary considering the best interests of the number of children whose rights are being violated’ relying on a decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR/the Commission) in African Institute for Human Rights and Development v Guinea.[7] In the cited Decision, the Commission held that a local remedy could not be exhausted given the number of potential victims who were in the region since it would be impractical for them to approach the courts. The Complainants are of the view that international law requires that the exhaustion of domestic remedies should only be in respect of those that are available, effective and adequate. And the Complainants argue that there is no effective judicial remedy for the talibes insofar as actio popularis in the Respondent State’s courts is not in favour of the talibes as they do not have standing to do so. In addition, the Complainants have invoked the jurisprudence of the Commission which reveals that in cases of “serious and massive violations”, local remedies need not be exhausted.[8]In this case, it is the Complainants’ submission that the failure by the Respondent State to protect “so many” children on the streets in the State's major cities where they suffer “egregious violations” of their rights enshrined in the Charter for so many years amount to “serious and massive violations”.
ACERWC’s analysis and decision on admissibility
16. The Committee notes that the Complainants are non-governmental organizations recognized by the African Union through the Commission; and are doing so on behalf of victim talibes in the Respondent State and therefore can be the authors of the Communication.
17. The Committee also notes that the Complainants have satisfied the conditions and requirement as to form as laid down in Chapter 2 Article 1(1) of the Committee’s Communication Guidelines, i.e. the communication explicitly states the name of the authors, is well written and concerns a State Party to the Charter.
18. In the matter of content of the Communication, the Committee agrees that the communication is compatible with the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Charter as it concerns violations of the provisions of the Charter. The Committee notes the Commission’s Decision in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe[9] to the effect that to be compatible with the Charter, the communication has only got to invoke provisions of the law which are presumed to have been violated.[10] The Committee in this matter also agrees with the Complainant that the Communication is not solely based on information circulated by media; rather it is based on information provided, inter alia, by the alleged victims primarily through personal interviews of the talibes made by the complaining NGOs and information obtained from reports made by credible organisations. In addition, the Committee has undertaken investigation and confirmed that the issue at hand has not been considered in another international procedure.
19. In considering whether or not the Complainants have exhausted local remedies available in the Respondent State, the Committee would like to reiterate its position that is stated in Children of Nubian Descents Case.[11] In that communication, the Committee held that Article 46 of the Charter mandates it to draw inspiration from International Law on Human Rights. Basing this explicit legislative mandate, the Committee made ‘reference to laws, and jurisprudence from other countries or treaty bodies in Africa and elsewhere.’[12]
20. The Committee would also like to draw inspiration from the ACHPR in considering the requirement to exhaust local remedy. In Sir Dawda Jawara v The Gambia™ the Commission held that a remedy is considered “available” if the complainant can pursue it without impediment™', it is deemed “effective” if it offers a prospect of success; and it is found “sufficient” if it is capable of redressing the complaint.[13]Therefore, it is a well-established jurisprudence of the Commission that ‘only domestic remedies that are available, effective, and adequate (sufficient) that need to be exhausted’.[14] As such, the Commission has recognized that the exhaustion of prior domestic remedies implies and assumes the availability, effectiveness and sufficiency of domestic adjudication procedures. If local remedies are unduly prolonged, unavailable, ineffective or insufficient, the exhaustion rule will not bar consideration of the case by the Commission.[15]
21. From this analysis of the jurisprudence of the Commission, the following exceptions to the rule of prior exhaustion of local remedy are remarkable. First, domestic remedies must be of “judicial nature"; second, domestic remedies must not be “unduly prolonged"; third, where there are “ouster” clauses domestic remedies are rendered unavailable; and, fourth, local remedies cannot be exhausted where there are a large number of potential victims of violations of human rights.
22. The Complainants have amply demonstrated that the Respondent State’s penal laws (Penal Code[16] and Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices and to Protect Victims adopted by the Respondent State in 2005[17]) proscribe forcing a child to beg.[18] However, the Respondent State has made little efforts to enforce these provisions with a view to penalizing the marabouts who force talibes to beg. It is in record that, as of 2011 only 10 cases were brought to court resulting in nine convictions on marabouts. The Complaints have submitted that the highest actual duration of imprisonment for all conventions under the foregoing laws was one month imprisonment and the Committee is of the view that this avenue inefficient.
23. The Committee also finds the avenue to petition the Chief Prosecutor to bring a claim to court on behalf of the talibes victims of violations of their rights by marabouts in the daaras to be ineffective because the Chief Prosecutor’s decision is made discretionary and in consultation with the Minister responsible for justice, which does not amount to a remedy that is judicial in nature. Another avenue that the Complainants also have indicated to be in place in the Respondent State is the requirement that only the victim talibes or someone directly affected by the alleged violations can bring cases in domestic courts. In practice, this would entail each of the estimated 100,000 talibes would bring their own claim in courts. The Committee concurs with Complainants’ submission that this avenue is “so impractical as to be virtually impossible”. Therefore, the Committee is of the view that the Complainants should avail from the exceptions of the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies as there is no effective and sufficient remedy for the talibes.
24. In view of the forgoing reasons, during its 21st Ordinary Session, which was held 15 to 19 April 2013, the Committee found the Communication to have fulfilled all the admissibility conditions as laid down in the Committee’s Guidelines on the Consideration of Communications and as such, the Committee declared the Complaint admissible.
25. After the decision on admissibility, the Committee transmitted the complaint to the Respondent State, which duly filed its written reply, after which the matter was scheduled for a public hearing. During its 23rd Ordinary Session, from 9-16 April 2014 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, a public hearing was held where representatives of the Complainants and the Respondent State made their oral submissions.
The Respondent State’s Arguments
26. Both in its written reply to the Complaints and oral submissions, the Respondent State has not specifically rejected the allegations. It has actually admitted that the alleged violations of the various Charter provisions exist, and continue to take place.
27. In recognition of the existence of the alleged violations, the Respondent State submitted that it has adopted various constitutional, policy, legislative and administrative measures aimed at, inter alia, protecting all children, particularly those forced to beg. In particular, the Respondent State contended that as a result of a workshop that was held early 2013 to formulate strategic plans of action for the eradication of child begging, an inter-ministerial council on the managing of child begging was convened on Friday, 8 February 2013, under the auspices of the Honourable Prime Minister. Consequent to this event, an ad-hoc Committee was set up and it has adopted a number of recommendations which revolve around three strategic options:
(a) The withdrawal of all child beggars from the street and their temporary placement in public institutions, community centres and voluntary families, as well their integration with their family or country of origin. This would also involve the implementation of measures relative to the educational aspects and to economic support for the family;
(b) Social Policy Communication for a positive and lasting behavioural change that occurs through effective application of the law and with the strong will of political, religious, social, and cultural actors aimed at eradicating child begging; and
(c) The prevention aspect; that is, while particularly emphasising policy and law enforcement, there is a need for utilising existing initiatives by the communities to assist children in their villages of origin and the strengthening of public and community social services.
28. In respect of eliminating worst forms of child labour, the Respondent State submitted that it has undertaken various measures; including establishing the Project for the Fight against the Worst Forms of Child Labour within the Ministry of Labour. Regarding the improvement of the quality of education in the daaras, the Respondent State contended that it has set up the Trilingual Project of the Direction of Alphabetisation and of National Languages within the Ministry of National Education (i.e. Le Projet Trilinguisme de la Direction de l’Alphabetisation et des Langues Nationales'). This project strives to intervene in the daaras in order to offer the opportunity to the talibes of learning and mastering three (3) languages (i.e. French, Arabic and a national language translated in Arabic characters), in addition to vocational skills training.
29. With reference to the protection of talibes and other children on the street from physical abuses, the Respondent State submitted that its Ministry of Interior has a specialised police force, the Minors Brigade, whose mission is to protect morally threatened children, to identify them and to ensure their reintegration, in collaboration with the other structures. In addition, the Ministry of Health is developing numerous initiatives for the development of the welfare of children, including I’Ecole Nationale des Travailleurs Sociaux Specialises (ENTSS), which has, since 2005, introduced a training module on the rights of the child. There is also the Support Cell to the Protection of the Child, which is located at the Presidency to support different initiatives from state and civil society structures.
30. The Respondent State also submitted that it has been striving to involve non-state actors, particularly local and international NGOs (including Community-based organisations) to provide assistance, advocacy and prevention interventions. Moreover, communities and families play a primary role in the protection of children, in order to develop a common understanding of the existing structures, to create a public consensus and to guide the taking of decisions at the national level.
31. Furthermore, the Respondent State pointed out that it has ratified various international human rights treaties, particularly the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and ILO Conventions on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour and the Minimum Age Convention, namely the Conventions 138 and 182. These international treaties have been domesticated in the State Party’s legislation in the context of the 2001 Constitution, particularly through the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedures, which entrenches the best interests of the child. Other pieces of legislations include the Penal Code[19]; the 79-1165 Decree of 20 December 1975, which prohibit punishment and physical abuse in schools and education centres which are not conventional; the 2004-38 law of 28 December 2004, which has abolished death penalty and applies to all children without exception, even to foreign and migrant children; and the 2005-06 law of 10 May 2005, which criminalizes trafficking in persons, including children, and similar practices, as well as prohibiting forced begging.
32. The Respondent concluded its submission by indicating that the eradication of child begging has always been a source of constant problem for the Senegalese authorities, despite the enactment of several provisions of the law, decrees, policies, and various administrative measures.
A. Alleged Violation of Article 4 (best interest of the child)
33. The Complainants allege that the Respondent State has violated Article 4 of the African Children’s Charter, which provides for the best interest of the child, as the State has failed to protect talibes from violations in the daaras. They also allege that the Respondent State is duty bound to assert the best interest of children by regulating the conduct of non-state actors and ensuring that they do not violate children’s rights.
34. The Committee notes that Article 4 of the African Children Charter requires the best interest of the child, one of the four general principles, to be the primary consideration in all actions to be taken by any person or authority., The principle of the best interest of the child aims at safeguarding the realization of children’s rights effectively and contributing to their holistic development.[20]
35. In guaranteeing the best interest of the child, a State Party has the obligation to ensure the consideration of the best interest of the child in all actions taken by “any person” or authority affecting the life of the child. In this context, “any person” is broadly interpreted and entails that entails that the principle of the best interest of the child must be applied in all actions concerning children, regardless whether those actions are undertaken by private or public entities. . The Committee also notes that ’action’ includes omissions and commissions that are manifested in decisions, proposals, services, procedures and other measures.[21]
36. Applying the principle of the best interest of the child to the vase at hand, the Committee notes that apart from the interest of parents to send their children to receive religious education, Talibes children in the Respondent State go to the daaras mainly because of the difficulties of attaining government schooling in their precincts. In the daaras, the children are forced to beg by their teachers (marabouts), where on average, they spend six to eight hours begging with five hours or less left to spend on Qur’anic studies per day.
37. The Respondent State, being a State Party to the Charter, accepts the explicit prohibition of child begging under Article 29 (b) and it has complied with this obligation through its prohibition of child begging as provided for under Article 245 to 247(b) of its Penal Code. However, the Respondent State has failed to discharge its obligation to enforce these provisions by not taking the necessary administrative measures, including supervision of the daaras and bringing to justice the marabouts who force talibes into begging. The State Party has the obligation to protect the rights enshrined in the Charter, which requires measures by the State to ensure that third parties (individuals, institutions, etc.) do not deprive of children’s rights. In this regard the Committee refers to the jurisprudence as established by the African commission on Humans and Peoples’ Rights. In Mouvement Burkinabe des Droits de I'Homme et des Peuples v Burkina Faso, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (henceforth, “the Commission”) has set the jurisprudence to the effect that a State Party is responsible for violation of human rights committed by non-state actors as its obligation to ensure the respect for human rights demands it to take all the necessary measures to ensure that non-state actors also respect the rights of children.[22] The Commission has also stipulated that failure to prevent violation against children’s rights by non-state actors makes the State internationally responsible.[23] An obligation of this type is called an obligation to protect the human rights standard, or, in short, the ‘obligation to protect’. Building on the Commission’s jurisprudence, the Committee states that the individual responsibility of non-State actors to respect the rights of children does not relieve the concerned State of its obligations under human rights law to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.
38. In the case at hand, despite the obligation set under the principle of the best Interests of the child, the Committee notes that the Government of Senegal has failed to enforce current national, regional, and international laws and agreements already in place by taking measures, including prosecuting, against perpetrators and abusive religious leaders; and hence the Respondent State has failed its responsibility to protect.
39. Therefore, the Respondent State is responsible under Article 4 of the Charter for not taking necessary administrative and other measures against the daaras, marabouts as well as parents who send their children to the daaras.
B. Alleged violation of Article 5 (survival and development)
40. The Complainants in this communication allege that the Respondent State has violated the right to survival and development of the talibes as enshrined in the Charter by not taking any action against the forced begging. The Complainants further state that the forced begging of the talibes causes the disregard of their rights to health care, education, clean and safe environment, and clean water, which in effect are fundamental components of the right to survival and development. Furthermore, the fixed quota imposed on talibes for begging subjects them to an extensive, institutionalized child labour.
41. Considering the allegation made by the Complainants, the Committee carefully analysed the situation of the children in light of the elements of the right to survival and development. Article 5 (1) of the African Children’s Charter provides that every child has an inherent right to life and this right must be protected by law. Article 5(2) complements the recognition of this right by obliging states to ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival, protection and development of the child. The Committee notes the complementary nature of the right to survival and development as essential preconditions to the enjoyment of the rights protected in the African Children’s Charter. In other words, the Committee supports the conceptualization of the right to life survival and development as a general principle that serves to reinforce the raison d'etre of each of the rights enshrined in the Charter.[24]
42. Survival and development encapsulates the right to life and imposes an obligation on states to ensure an adequate standard of living for children including the right to life and their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological and social development. The obligations of the State Party under this principle also encompass protection of children’s rights to access healthcare and education services, access to clean water, the right to live in safe and clean environment, and protection from any form of abuse and degrading treatment, including child labour.
43. In the case at hand, the Committee notes that most talibes are suffering from extreme hunger on a daily basis, often eating at best one or two small meals a day, usually consisting of bread and rice. Reports and studies reveal that the majority of begging children in Dakar, including talibes, were observed to be malnourished, often severely. The Committee also note that deprived of food by their guardians, many talibes are forced to beg in markets or door-to-door in neighborhoods to try to fulfill their daily nutritional needs. As a result of the long hours talibes spend on the street, the malnutrition they suffer from inadequate food, and the deplorable conditions in many daaras, resulted in suffering of the children from frequent illnesses.
44. The Committee also notes that there is a reported case where nine Talibes in the dense Medina neighborhood died after a daara burned down on 03 March 2013. Cases of talibes being crushed in traffic while begging are also frequently reported.
45. Despite the gravity of the problem, the Respondent State has not taken adequate measures to curb the situation. The Committee strongly believe that in the face of this tragedy, the Senegalese Government must finally tackle the country’s widespread abuse and exploitation of young boys through forced begging. Tens of thousands of boys continue to live and beg in extremely precarious conditions, enriching teachers who have twisted the country’s tradition of religious education. The Committee, therefore, found the situation unacceptable and it contradicts the principles enshrined in the African Children’s Charter and other international child rights instruments. Hence, the Government of Senegal has failed to ensure to the maximum extent possible, the survival, protection, and development of the talibes children, As such, the Respondent State is in violation of Article 5 of the African Children’s Charter.
C. Alleged violation of Article 11 (education)
46 . Article 11 of the Charter posits that States Parties have the obligation to provide free and compulsory basic education without any discrimination.[25] In realizing the right to education, the State must ensure, inter alia, the availability, accessibility and acceptability of the education provided to children. Availability is assessed in terms of quality; accessibility is determined in terms of equal opportunity, economic and physical accessibility and acceptability is inferred from the quality of education provided.[26] A State Party is not only obliged to provide education but also to ensure that the education so provided is of acceptable quality. In the context of Article 11(2)(a) of the Charter, education should be directed towards the development of child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential. The Committee has noted the importance of education in relation to the responsibility of the child in its decision of the Children of Nubian Descents Case.[27]Children have responsibility to their family, society and country under Article 31 of the Charter; and, as such, they can discharge these obligations only when they get the necessary education. Furthermore, education is a tool to enhance the protection of children from dangerous and hazardous labour.[28] As the Commission has accentuated that the failure to provide access to institutions of learning would amount to a violation of the right to education under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.[29]
47 .The responsibility of a State in realizing the right to education includes the obligation to protect, fulfill, respect and promote. The protection mandate entails a responsibility up on the State to protect children’s right to education from being violated by third parties. To this end the State Party should set minimum standards for all educational institutions[30] including the daaras. Article 11(5) of the Charter moreover states that:
States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is subjected to schools or parental discipline shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the child and in conformity with the present Charter.
48 .The Respondent State, however, has failed to provide free and compulsory education to all children in accordance with the Charter. Consequently, the talibes are forced to attend in the daaras where they are not subjected to school fees except for the daily quota they should bring by begging. Nevertheless, the children do not get the necessary education they are entitled to in the daaras. The talibes do not get education in daaras as they spend more time in begging to fulfill their daily quota. In addition, the government failed to provide the necessary curriculum and facilities in which the daaras function in delivering education.
49 .The Committee refers to the General Comment of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the aims of education, which states that education should be designed to empower the child by developing his or her skills, learning and other capacities, human dignity, self-esteem and self-confidence.[31] Moreover, the Committee also refers to Article 9(b) of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam which states that ‘every human being has a right to receive both religious and worldly education’. Therefore, the Committee holds a view that while many marabouts in Senegal continue the traditional practice of teaching their students the Quran, others have twisted the practice into a form of economic exploitation, as a result a significant number of talibes in Senegal are failing to receive either a religious education or an education in other basic skills. It is in consideration of this fact that the International Labour Organization (ILO)'s Committee of Experts criticized Senegal on March 2, 2012, for its failure to protect talibes from abusive conditions and dema nded that Senegal do more to prosecute those responsible for forced begging and to carry out ‘daara modernization’ - ensuring that the schools meet basic international standards of education and child protection.
50 .The government must enforce its own laws to protect talibes from this abuse and ensure that the education received in daaras equips these children with a rounded education, and does not allow forced begging. The Senegalese government enacted legislation in 2005 that criminalized forcing others into begging for personal financial gain. But the authorities have largely failed to take concrete steps to enforce the law and end the exploitation and abuse of the talibes. Therefore, the Government of Senegal has violated the right to education of the talibes by failing to ensure the availability, accessibility and acceptability of the education and supervising the daaras.
D. Alleged violation of Article 14 (health and health services)
51 . The Charter under Article 14 provides that State Parties should take measures to ensure ‘the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care; and to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water’. In Purohit & Moore V The Gambia the Commission stated that:
Enjoyment of human right to health as it is widely known is vital to all aspects of a person’s life and wellbeing and is crucial to the realization of all the other fundamental human rights and freedoms. This right includes the right to health facilities, access to goods and services to be guaranteed to all without discrimination of any kind.[32]
52 .The efforts undertaken by the State Party in realizing this right should be directed towards the prevention of diseases and health problems, and the provision of the necessary health care services. In ensuring adequate nutrition and safe drinking water to all children, the CRC committee emphasized that school feeding programmes, and the provision of safe and clean drinking water are essential to combat disease and malnutrition.[33]Failure to provide safe drinking water amounts to a violation of the right to the best attainable health under the Charter?[34]
53 . Looking at the case under consideration, the poor conditions in the daara, combined with a lack of clothes and shoes for the long days on the street, increase the vulnerability of the talibes to different forms of health challenges. Forced to beg for food, many are also extremely malnourished. The Committee notes that when the talibes get sick their marabout rarely provides medicines, in some instances requiring them to beg even greater hours in order to pay for their own treatment. More often, despite their ill health the talibes continue begging to satisfy the quota.
54 .The Respondent State has the obligation to assure that children are not deprived of access to health care services. It should further take all the necessary steps to avert any kind of institutional, cultural and financial obstacle to accessing health care services.[35]The State should not tolerate any practice which violates the right to health of children.[36] It must assert that third parties do not deprive children of their right to access medical service.
55 .As submitted by the complainants, the talibes are not practically entitled to adequate sanitation and nutrition which in effect endangers their health. The Committee notes that the marabouts as caregivers have failed to ensure that the talibes get medical service.
56 . Hence the Committee concluded that the Respondent State has failed to provide the necessary sanitation and nutrition to the talibes and it has also failed to take measures against the marabouts, who accommodate talibes in squalid health conditions. The Respondent State has not taken appropriate steps within its available resource to prevent disease and malnutrition, as well as to avoid barriers to access the health services of those children in need of medical care. Therefore, the Committee finds the Respondent State in violation of Article 14 of the Charter.
E. Alleged violation of Article 15 (child labour)
57 .The Complainants allege that the urban talibes are an identifiable group of children vulnerable to be exploited for the worst forms of child labour. Accordingly they submit that the number of hours the children spent per day begging, the beatings for not bringing a sufficient quota of goods per day and the health and safety risks caused by standing in busy streets is contrary to international laws which categorize child begging as a practice of exploitive labour.3®
58 .Art 15 of the African Children’s Charter obliges State Parties to take legislative and administrative measures for the formal and informal employment sector to protect children from all types of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with their physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. Further the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention 182 under Art 1 and 9 requires States to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and implementation of the Convention.
59 . In the case at hand, contrary what is prescribed under the regional and international instruments, the Committee notes that many marabous force the talibes to beg on the streets for long hours—a practice that meets the ILO definition of a worst form of child labor. The Committee is of the view that the forced begging, physical abuse, and dangerous daily living conditions endured by these talibes violate domestic and international law. Despite being party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and all major international and regional treaties on child labor and trafficking, which provide clear prohibitions against the worst forms of child labor, physical violence, and trafficking, Senegal has scantily enforced the laws.
60 . The Committee notes that in the last decade, the government has notably defined forced begging as a worst form of child labor and criminalized forcing another into begging for economic gain, but this adequate legislation has so far led to little concrete action. No marabout was held accountable for forced begging, gross neglect, and severe physical abuse against the talibes.
61 . In view of this, the Committee believes that forced begging places children in a harmful situation on the street and therefore meets the ILO’s definition of a worst form of child labor. Moreover, the Committee notes that the forced begging and gross neglect is done with a view toward exploitation, with the marabout receiving the child from his/her parents and profiting from the child’s labor, which resulted in continuous suffering of
39 UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted September 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force April 30, 1957, acceded to by Senegal July 19, 1979, art 1(d)
tens of thousands of talibes in Senegal. Though the Respondent State has ratified international laws and prohibits the act of child begging under its national law, it has failed to take any effective administrative measures against the marabouts and to protect the talibes from exploitation. Therefore, the Government of Senegal has violated Article 15 (2) of the African Children’s Charter which requires the State Party to take appropriate administrative measures to ensure the full protection of children from child labor having regard to the relevant provisions of the ILO’s instruments.
F. Alleged violation of Article 16 (protection against child abuse and torture)
62. In this communication the Complainants submit that the fact that the talibes are regularly subjected to beatings and fear in cases where they do not reach the minimum daily begging quota, leads to high levels of stress and anxiety which amounts to violation of their right to be protected from abuse and torture under Art 16 of the African Children's Charter.
63. Considering the complaint, the Committee notes that as prescribed under the African Children's Charter, protecting children from abuse and torture requires States to adopt legislative, administrative, social and educational measures through effective establishment of special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and identification, reporting referral investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child abuse and neglect.
64. Taking into consideration the elements of the provision of the law and the acts as alleged by the Complainants, the Committee discusses whether the beatings committed by marabouts amounts to child abuse and torture. In this regard the Committee refers to the jurisprudences of the ACHPR. In Curtis Francis Doebbler v Sudan the African Commission found the act of lashing as it constitutes a cruel treatment.[37] Moreover, in International Pen and Others v Nigeria, the ACHPR defines inhumane and degrading treatment to include ‘not only actions which cause serious physical or psychological suffering, but which humiliate the individual or force him or her to act against his will or conscience’.[38]
65. In the case at hand, the Committee notes that the beating of the talibes qualifies as a physical punishment since physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort for not bringing the required quota. There are also reported cases where talibes typically described being taken to a room, stripped of their shirt, and beaten with an electric cable or a club.[39] In some instances the beatings and physical abuse may rise to the level of torture under the Convention against Torture. According to the Convention 'torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity'[40].
66. With regard to the accountability of State actors for acts committed by non-state actors, the Committee refers to the explanation given by the Committee on the Convention against Torture. The Committee on the Convention against Torture states that 'where state authorities or others acting in official capacity or under colour of law, know or have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture or ill- treatment are being committed by non-State officials or private actors and they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such non-State officials or private actors consistently with the Convention, the State bears responsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, complicit or otherwise responsible under the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in such impermissible act’.[41]
67. Legislative, administrative, social and educational measures are the means through which States can fulfill their obligation to protect children from any form of violence.[42]Although there are legislative and social initiatives in Senegal to protect the rights of children in general, the government failed to take specific administrative and judicial measures against the marabouts. The Respondent State did not deny the fact that since 2010 only 10 cases have been brought against marabouts who exploits children resulting in only nine convictions. Apart from the social term orientation for children in the street and destitute families and 24 Department Committees for the Protection of the Child (CDPE),[43] the Committee notes that there are no educational and sufficient social measures that aim at changing the situation of the talibes.
68. As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated that the prohibition against physical and mental violence also applies to corporal punishment in schools.[44] The physical abuse likewise places the marabout in conflict with Senegal’s penal code, which provides particular care to children.[45] The severe physical abuse that many marabouts inflict on the talibes, as well as the looming threat of violence, therefore violates the children’s right to freedom from physical and mental violence and abuse and torture. The Government of Senegal therefore is in clear violation of Article 16 of the African Children’s Charter which requires the State Party to protect children from physical, mental, injury, abuse, neglect, maltreatment and torture.
G. Alleged violation of Article 21 (protection against harmful social and cultural practices)
69. According to Article 21(1)(a) of the African Children’s Charter, States Parties are under obligation to take measures towards the elimination of harmful social and cultural practices which endanger the health or life of the child. Furthermore, Article 1(3) of the Charter provides that:
Any custom, tradition, culture or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such inconsistency be discouraged.
70. A harmful practice, according to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), should meet the following criteria;
(a) They constitute a denial of the dignity and/or integrity of the individual and a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the two Conventions;
(b) They constitute discrimination against women or children and are harmful insofar as they result in negative consequences for them as individuals or groups, including physical, psychological, economic and social harm and/or violence and limitations on their capacity to participate fully in society or develop and reach their full potential;
(c) They are traditional, re-emerging or emerging practices that are prescribed and/or kept in place by social norms that perpetuate male dominance and inequality of women and children, based on sex, gender, age and other intersecting factors;
They are imposed on women and children by family, community members, or society at large, regardless of whether the victim provides, or is able to provide, full, free and informed consent.[46]
71 .Therefore, States Parties must take legislative, administrative and other appropriate measures to abolish any practice inconsistent with the Charter. Using children in any form of begging is one form of harmful practice which is clearly prohibited under Article 29 of the African Children’s Charter; and the State must take all the necessary steps to restrict such practice.
72 . Even though the Respondent State has outlawed the practice of forced begging under Article 3 of Law No. 2005-06, the talibes are still being forced to beg and bring back to the daaras a daily quota the failure of which incurs punishment. The State has not taken any measures against these schools. The talibes are required to bring a daily quota, in order to fulfill their quota they have to beg on the street where they will be exposed to exploitation. The forced begging has compromised their right to life and development as they are often injured from traffic accidents. Moreover, this cultural practice by the marabouts causes the violation of other provisions of the Charter. The talibes are not enjoying their legal right to play, leisure and cultural activities which can advance their mental and psychological developments. This activity of begging is deep rooted in the Qur’anic schools and the Committee is of the view that it is a harmful practice.
73 .The government of Senegal has failed to take measures against the marabouts, to monitor the situation of children in the Qur’anic schools, and to ensure that the talibes are getting the necessary education to which they are entitled. Even though the marabouts are non-state actors, the State of Senegal is responsible for the violation caused by such actors due to its obligation to protect the rights of children. The Committee thus finds a violation of Article 21(1) of the African Children’s Charter by the Respondent State.
74 Alleged violation of Article 29 (sale, trafficking and abduction, and using children in the form of begging)
74. Citing Article 29 of the African Children’s Charter, the complainants argued that the State Party has violated the Charter which expressly forbids forced begging and States Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic of children for any purpose or in any form, by any person including parents or legal guardians of the child; and the use of children in all forms of begging. The complainants also made reference to the ILO Conventions which make it clear that states are responsible for the prevention of child labour through effective enforcement. Further, they expressly state that work akin to slavery (which includes trafficking of children and compulsory labour) and work that harms the health, safety or morals of children comprises the worst forms of child labour.[47]
75. Considering the alleged fact, the Committee finds it important to expound on what amounts to child sale, trafficking and abduction. The Committee notes that children are one of the most vulnerable groups targeted for the trafficking in human beings. Children are trafficked as they can be easily recruited and quickly replaced. The exploitation of children violates the human rights of children to have a safe child- ood in their family setting, to receive education, to have time to play and to be protec ted from exploitation. Child trafficking involves the recruitment of victims, their transportation, transfer and harbouring of children for the purpose of exploitation. Coercion, violence or threats are not necessary elements in cases of child trafficking as children cannot consent.[48] Children are trafficked for the same purposes as adults: for sexual exploitation, for labour exploitation but also for exploitation in a range of criminal activities, including begging.
76. The use of children in all forms of begging is strictly forbidden under Article 29(b) of the Africa Children’s Charter. Article 29(a) in addition prohibits trafficking of children for any purpose in any form. In this regard, the Committee refers to the definition provided by the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). Under Article 3 the Protocol defines trafficking as;
‘[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs’
77. The Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children as adopted by the African Union Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22-23 November 2006, also conceptualizes trafficking in persons as it happens within and between states, urges States to take measures to eliminate harmful customs and traditional practices, including forced child begging, which can lead to trafficking in human beings, including children.
78. Looking at the case at hand, the Committee realized that the talibes are forcibly subjected to economic exploitation through forced labour; and they are used for begging by the marabouts. Given the ILO’s views on forced begging, the Committee concludes that marabouts, when transporting talibes with the primary intention of obtaining labour from them, are engaging in child trafficking. Article 3(c) of the Trafficking in Persons Protocol includes in the definition of 'trafficking in persons’ the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation.”
79. Moreover, the Committee learns from reports that only about half the talibes in Senegal are Senegalese. The rest are trafficked from neighboring countries, including Guinea Bissau and Mali, where poor families are promised their sons will be remunerated as they will receive ‘a proper’ Islamic education under the care of a marabout at the daaras. The boys often have no contact with their families once they leave home, and because most do not know anyone in Senegal, they become entirely reliant on marabout for food, health care and shelter.
80. These acts, according to the Committee violate the children’s rights to be protected from sale, trafficking and abduction. The Respondent State has not contested this allegation of the Complainants. The Committee has observed that the Respondent State has taken legislative measures against begging and trafficking. However, the Committee is of the view that legislative measures alone cannot sufficiently protect the rights of children; and the State Party should also take administrative and other appropriate measures to ensure that children are not subjected to begging or trafficking as stipulated under Article 1 of the Charter. Reaffirming this position in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe,[49] the ACHPR states that ‘an act by a private individual or (non-state actor) and therefore not directly imputable to a state, can generate responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence on the part of the state to prevent the violation or for not taking the necessary steps to provide the victims with reparation.’[50]
81. The Committee, therefore, has found the Respondent State in violation of Article 29 of the African Children’s’ Charter which with no exception prohibits forced begging and requires States Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or trafficking of children.
Decision of the African Committee
82. Because of the foregoing reasons, the Committee finds multiple violations of the African Children’s Charter as follows: Article 4 (best interest of the child); Article 5 (survival and development); Article 11 (the right to education); Article 14 (health and health services); Article 15 (child labour); Article 29 (sale, trafficking and abduction); Article 16 (protection against child abuse and torture); and Article 21 (protection against harmful social and cultural practices). Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Respondent State should, in accordance with its obligations under the African Children’s Charter, undertake the necessary measures:
(a) To ensure that all talibes are immediately taken back from the streets to their families;
(b) Through cooperation with the neighboring countries (from where some of the children are coming), international and national organisations, facilitate the reunion of the talibes with their families;
(c) To establish functioning and effective institutions and mechanisms to provide the talibes with short- and long-term, appropriate psychological, medical and social assistance in order to promote their full recovery;
(d) To establish minimum norms and standards for all daaras relating to health, safety, hygiene, education content and quality, and accommodation;
(e) To integrate the daaras into the formal education system;
(f) To inspect the daaras regularly to ensure that standards set out in the Charter and local legislation are complied with and close all the daaras which are not in compliance with the required standards;
(g) With a view of fighting impunity and preventing forced begging, sale, abduction and trafficking of children, ensure that all the perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable for their actions with penalties commensurate with the severity of their crimes;
(h) On the talibes right to education:
(1) Make sure that education contributes in promoting and developing their personality, talents and their physical and mental abilities to their fullest potential,
(ii)The Government's education policy should be reviewed in light of fostering respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
(111) Ensure the provision of free and compulsory basic education.
(i) To train law enforcement and judicial personnel, social workers, traditional and religious leaders, parents and the community at large on children’s rights in general and prohibitions of child begging in particular;
(j) To conduct joint studies with the concerned neighboring State Parties on the situation of talibes' children in Senegal and countries of origin;
(k) To fully recognize and implement the rights included in the African Children’s Charter and in other international instruments;
(l) While complying with its reporting obligation in accordance with article 43 of the African Children’s Charter, the State Party should provide the Committee with sufficient information on the progress of implementation of the current decision
(m)To cooperate with the African Union, International and National Organisations, the UN Agencies, particularly UNICEF, ILO, World Health organisation (WHO), with a view to fully implement these recommendations and alleviate the challenges of talibes in Senegal; and
(n) As per Section XXI (1) of the Revised Communication Guidelines of the Committee, the Government shall report to the Committee on all measures taken to implement the decision of the Committee within 180 days from the date of receipt of the Committee’s decision.
Done at the 23rd Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 April 2014
Prof Benyam Chairperson of the African on the Rights and We
13 Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. Nos. 147/95 and 149/96 (2000).
14 Similarly, the decision of the Commission in Anuak Justice Council v Ethiopia [op. cit, para. 51] requires that ‘three major criteria could be deduced in determining the rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, namely: that the remedy must be available, effective and sufficient.' [Ceesay v The Gambia Communication 86/93]. According to the Commission, a remedy is considered to be available ‘if the petitioner can pursue it without impediments or if he can make use of it in the circumstances of his case.' [Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia, op. cit, para. 31].
[2] Law 65-60 of 21 July 1965.
[3] lfiaUcfe§-5£l5>ft31’40|y>)106the Penal Code prescribe a 3-6 month term of imprisonment for any person who allows a
3 Articles 245 to 247(b) of the Penal Code prescribe a 3-6 month term of imprisonment for any person who allows a child to beg on his or her behalf.
[4] Law No. 2005-06 of Senegal.
[5] Articles 77 and 92 of the Constitution of Senegal (2001).
[6] Amnesty International, Comite Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan ACHPR 1999.
[7] (2004) ACHRLR 57 (ACHPR 2004) para 34.
[8] See for instance Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture, Association Internationale des Juristes Democrates, Commission Internationale de Juristes, Union Interafricaine des droits de I’Homme v Rwanda (1996) (No’s. 27/89-46/91-99/93) para 18.
[9] Communication No. 245/2002 ACHPR.
[10] See also FIDH, Organisation nationale de droits de /’’Homme (ONDH) and Rencontre africaine pour la defense des droits de I’Homme (RADDHO) v Senegal Communication No. 304/2005 ACHPR.
[11] The decision on communication 002/2009 IHRDA and OSJI (on behalf of children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v Kenya, adopted by the ACERWC on 22 March 2011, during its 17th Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia from 22-29 March 2011.
[12] Nubian case, para 25.
[13] Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia, ibid, paras 31 and 32.
[14] Constitutional Rights Project [CRP] v Nigeria Communication No. 60/91. See too citations therein pertaining to the jurisprudence of the African Commission in this regard and Dawda Jawara v The Gambia Communication Nos. 147/95 and 149/96, para.32.
[15] Sir Dawda K. Jawara, op. cit, paras. 31-32.
[16] Law 65-60 of 21 July 1965.
[17] Law No. 2005-06 of Senegal.
[18] Articles 245 to 247(b) of the Penal Code prescribe a 3-6 month term of imprisonment for any person who allows a child to beg on his or her behalf. The Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices and to Protect Victims prescribes 5-10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of five to twenty million CFA francs for a person found guilty of forcing a child to beg.
[19] In particular, Articles 245-247 criminalize child begging; Articles 298 and 299, criminalize wounds and blows/assault on a child who is below 15 years; Article 339 criminalizes the non-declaration to the civil status office; and Article 350 criminalizes neglect. In addition, Decree No 64-088 of 6 February 1964 (JO No3664, page 283) prohibits child begging in all its forms; the law of July 1975, inserted in the Penal Code in articles 245 and et seq. prohibits begging; and the 2005-06 law of 29 April 2005 criminalises trafficking of vulnerable people and prohibits forced begging .
[20] Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration, para. 4
[21] Ibid, para 17.
[22] Mouvement Burkinabe des Droits de I'Homme et des Peuples v Burkina Faso para 42. See also Commission Nationale des Droits de I'Homme et des Libertes v Chad (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995).
[23] Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe Communication 245/2002.
[24] T Kaime 'the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective’ 2009, 119.
[25] See also Article 28 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
[26] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, Article 13: The Right to Education, 1999, para 6.
[27] The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and the Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf of children of Nubian Descent in Kenya) v the Government of Kenya, ACERWC, Com/002/2009, 22 March 2011, para.
66.
[28] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, Article 13: The Right to Education, 1999, para 1
[29] Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire, Communications No 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, para 11.
[30] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13, Article 13 The Right to Education,
1999, Para 54
[31] UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1, The Aims of Education, 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 (2001).
[32] Communication 241/2001, Purohit& Moore v The Gambia, Decision at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the African Commission, May 2003, 16th Annual Activity Report, Para 80
[33] Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 15, Article 24 on the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, 2013, Para 2(c)
[34] Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de I'Homme, Les Te moins de Jehovah v Zaire, October 1995, para 47
[35]Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 15, Article 24 on the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health, 2013, Para. 1
[36]SERAC v Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, para 52
[37] African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, Comm. No. 236/2000 (2003); see para. 42.
International Pen and Others (on behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998)
[39] Off the backs of children: forced begging and other abuses against talibes in snegal, Human Rights Watch report 2010.
[40]Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
[41] General Comment No2 on Article 2 of the Convention on
[42] General Comment No.8 (2006), The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia), para 30
[43] Response from Senegal, pp. 12-13
[44] UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8, The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (2006).
[45] Penal Code of Senegal, art. 298.
[46] Committee on the Rights of the Child and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Joint general recommendation/general comment No. 31 on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices, November 2014, para 15
[47] Para 58 & 59 of the Compliants' Communication.
[48] Article 3 (b) of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
[49] Communication 245/2002 [(2006) AHRLR 128 (ACHPR 2006)].
[50] Communication 279/03, Sudan Human Rights v The Sudan and 296/05 Centre on Human Rights and Evictions v The Sudan, May 2009, para 148.